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ABSTRACT 
THE LIMITS OF TURKISH SOFT POWER AND MEDIATION CAPABILITY: A 
COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF TURKISH INVOLVEMENT IN SYRIA AND 
SOMALIA 
 
MICHELLE HASKIN 
Master of Arts in Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 
M.A. Thesis, 2014 
Fuat Keyman, thesis supervisor 
 
Keywords: Mediation, Turkish foreign policy, Syria, Somalia 
 
Turkey's involvement in Somalia is a shining example of its use of soft power, with 
Somalis themselves providing the strongest endorsement. Meanwhile, Turkey's 
engagement with Syria started out promising, but hopes for the regime were brutally 
dashed with the start of the civil war and Turkey's switch to supporting the opposition. 
Despite the importance of these two conflicts to Turkey's foreign policy and mediation 
strategy, there is a dearth of academic literature about Turkish involvement in both of 
these conflicts, much less a direct comparison of both. This comparative case study 
describes Turkey's ongoing involvement in Somalia and Syria in more detail and takes 
this description further by comparing these specific cases to gain insight into Turkey's 
overall intervention strategy, specifically focusing on mediation capabilities. Turkey's 
involvement in conflicts before they reach the peak of violence or after violence has 
subsided has been successful, as demonstrated by the Somalia case. On the other hand, 
when Turkey attempts to become involved during the peak of a violent conflict, as it has 
in Syria, it cannot utilize the soft power tools it needs for a successful intervention such 
as educational exchanges, infrastructure development, and economic cooperation. 
Suggestions for future research indicate that Turkey should more closely track its 
involvement in various regional conflicts in order to feed this knowledge into its wider 
mediation strategy.   
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ÖZET 
TÜRK YUMUŞAK GÜCÜNÜN LİMİTLERİ VE ARABULUCULUK KAPASİTESİ: 
SURİYE VE SOMALİ’DE TÜRKİYE’NİN KATILIMININ KARŞILAŞTIRMALI 
SAHA ÇALIŞMASI 
 
MICHELLE HASKIN 
Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü Alanında Yüksek Lisans 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2014 
Tez Danışmanı: Fuat Keyman 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Arabuluculuk, Türk Dış Politikası, Suriye, Somali 
 
Somali’de Türkiye’nin müdahalesi, kendilerine güçlü bir destek sağlayan Somalililer ile 
birlikte, yumuşak güç kullanımına parlak bir örnektir. Bu sırada Türkiye’nin Suriye’ye 
karşı olan tavrı umut verici olarak başladı fakat rejime olan umutlar sivil savaşın 
başlamasıyla birlikte acımasızca kesildi ve Türkiye muhalefeti desteklemeye başladı. 
Bu iki çatışmanın Türkiye'nin dış politikası ve arabuluculuk stratejisi için önemine 
rağmen, her iki çatışma hakkında Türkiye’nin katılımı, her iki katılımın direk olarak 
karşılaştırılması hakkında akademik literatürde bir eksik bulunmaktadır. Bu 
karşılaştırmalı durum çalışması detaylı olarak Somali ve Suriye’de Türkiye’nin devam 
eden katılımını açıklar ve bu açıklamaların devamında özellikle arabuluculuk 
yeteneklerine odaklanarak, Türkiye’nin genel müdahale stratejisi hakkında fikir 
edinmemizi sağlamaktadır. Somali vakasında görüldüğü gibi Türkiye’nin 
müdahalelerde olan başarısı çatışmaların şiddeti tam olarak zirveye ulaşmadan veya 
şiddet sonlandıktan sonra gerçekleşmiştir. Diğer bir taraftan, Suriye örneğinde olduğu 
gibi, Türkiye, şiddetli bir çatışmanın zirvesinde müdahil olmaya çalıştığında, başarılı bir 
müdahale için gereken eğitimsel değişim, altyapı gelişimi ve ekonomik işbirliği gibi 
yumuşak güç araçlarını kullanamamaktadır. Gelecekteki araştırmalar için öneri olarak, 
Türkiye daha geniş çaplı bir katılım için bu konudaki bilgisini geliştirmek adına çeşitli 
bölgesel çatışmalarda kullanılan müdahaleleri daha yakından izlemesi gerekmektedir. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Turkey's foreign policy under the AKP government has focused on the regional 
use of soft power, particularly in countries with which Turkey shares a common 
historical, cultural, or religious bond. Among the many countries with which Turkey is 
currently involved, Somalia and Syria stand out as a stunning example of successful 
partnership, and engagement which could not prevent the onslaught of a violent 
conflict, respectively. The dearth of academic literature about Turkish involvement in 
both of these conflicts, much less a direct comparison of Turkish efforts in both, 
necessitates a close examination. By comparing these two cases, we can begin to answer 
the question of how Turkey can most effectively use its soft power and humanitarian aid 
to intervene in regional conflicts. My thesis aims to conduct an exploratory analysis of 
Turkey's actions in Somalia and Syria to understand a) What Turkey is currently doing 
in both conflicts in order to work toward peace and stability, b) the effects of Turkish 
involvement on the conflicts themselves and on Turkey internally, and c) what the 
comparison of the two cases can tell us about Turkey's larger strategy of conflict 
intervention and specifically, mediation.  
This comparative case study describes Turkey's ongoing intervention efforts in 
Somalia and Syria in more detail and takes this description further by comparing these 
specific cases to gain insight into Turkey's overall intervention strategy. My conclusion 
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is that Turkey's involvement in conflicts before they reach the peak of violence or after 
has been successful, as demonstrated by the Somalia case. On the other hand, when 
Turkey attempts to become involved during the peak of a violent conflict, as it has in 
Syria, it cannot utilize the soft power tools it needs for a successful intervention. 
Turkey's successful use of soft power and humanitarian aid can serve as a model for 
other small states and middle power countries interested in using their power and 
influence to become more involved in regional conflicts.  
Chapter Two Literature Review contains a literature review of Turkish foreign 
policy under the AKP government, including a discussion on mediation; a review of 
some recent literature on mediation as it is relevant to the current study, mainly focusing 
on the definition of mediation which will be compared and contrasted to what Turkey is 
currently doing in both cases; and a review of literature on humanitarian intervention 
and how that concept relates to Turkey's actions in the conflicts.  
Chapter Three Methodology discusses the comparative case study method, 
explains the reasoning for choosing the particular cases of Syria and Somalia; and 
discusses how evidence was gathered including interview techniques.  
Chapter Four Somalia and Chapter Five Syria contain an overview of the 
history, issues, and actors of the conflicts; a discussion of Turkish involvement; and the 
repercussions of that involvement. The chapters are organized according to Wehr's 
conflict map, which is a common method for analyzing conflict dynamics in the 
Conflict Analysis and Resolution field.  
Chapter Six Conclusions contrasts Turkey's rhetoric and action in Somalia and 
Syria, discusses how this contrast can shed light on Turkey's overall mediation and 
intervention philosophy, and contains suggestions for future research.  It also discusses 
how these findings may be applied to other conflict interventions; namely, the 
intervention of small states into protracted social conflicts.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
 
2.1. Overview of the AKP Government’s Foreign Policy 
 
The AKP’s foreign policy may be new, especially in its emphasis on soft power, 
but it is not a radical departure from Turkey’s past foreign policy and humanitarian 
endeavors. As Onis (2010) explained:  
It would be wrong to equate foreign policy activism exclusively with the AKP 
government. Elements of an active foreign policy approach in Turkey could be 
discerned throughout the post-Cold War era starting with Turgut Özal’s 
Presidency in the early part of the 1990s. The Foreign Minister of the Coalition 
Government of 1999-2002, Ismail Cem, also favoured a multidimensional, 
proactive foreign policy, yet with a firm Western axis. The early foreign policy 
of the AKP clearly represented a continuation of the pattern… Indeed, relations 
with the Middle East had already started to improve from 1999 onwards and 
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important initiatives designed to build economic and diplomatic links with 
Russia and the post-Soviet world can be traced to the early 1990s
1
. 
In fact, Aras and Gorener (2010) credited Turgut Özal with pushing Turkey to 
become a regional leader and bridge, moving away from an exclusively Western-
focused orientation and towards ‘establishing itself as the political and economic centre 
of a region covering the Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus, the Balkans and the Black 
Sea rim.’2 However, Turkey’s foreign policy and specifically involvement in regional 
conflicts has become more high-profile since the AKP came into power in 2002, when, 
according to Yalvaç, the party began to fully develop the 'New Ottomanism' begun 
under Ozal.
3
 Ahmet Davutoğlu became Foreign Minister in 2009, and is credited with 
the shift in Turkish foreign policy from an insular, Western-leaning focus to the "zero 
problems with neighbors approach" that sees Turkey supporting various former 
Ottoman countries and becoming actively involved in regional peacekeeping efforts.
4
 
Davutoğlu  is also deemed an 'intellectual of statecraft' who plays a significant role in 
shaping new foreign policy on a theoretical as well as practical level.
5
 His doctrine of 
strategic depth is intent on seeing Turkey create a new sphere of influence for itself in 
the region. In addition, the AKP's public support and creation of economic and social 
stability domestically has enabled it to become more involved in NATO, move forward 
on European Union membership negotiations, and become more involved in the 
                                                          
1
 Onis, Z. (2010).  Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying 
Dynamics And A Critique. Istanbul GLODEM Working Paper Series p.4-5. 
2
 Aras, B. and Gorener A. (2010) National role conceptions and foreign policy 
orientation: the ideational bases of the Justice and Development Party’s foreign policy 
activism in the Middle East. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, p.80 
3
 Yalvaç, Faruk. (2012). Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth? A Critical Realist 
Analysis of Turkey's Position in the World System. International Relations 26, p. 165. 
4
 The Economist. (2010). The Davutoğlu  effect. Retrieved on 11 May 2013. See also 
Aras, B. (2009). The Davutoğlu  era in Turkish Foreign Policy. Today's Zaman. 
Retrieved on 15 May 2013.  
5
 Yalvaç, Faruk. (2012). Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth? A Critical Realist 
Analysis of Turkey's Position in the World System. International Relations 26, p. 165. 
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surrounding region than previous administrations.
6
 Several scholars have proposed 
explanations for Turkey’s emergence. Çandar in 2009 succinctly identified the 
explanation as fivefold: the decline of American influence in the region, the 
ineffectiveness of EU policy, the destruction of Sunni dominance following the Iraq 
war, Turkey’s growing economic power and Turkey’s political modernization, making 
it a role model for Muslim countries.
7
 
According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs ‘New economic dynamics 
and an increasing sense of responsibility for promoting global peace through 
contributing to global sustainable development have enabled Turkey to emerge as a new 
and dynamic player in the international development cooperation architecture.’8 Turkey 
uses "a wide range of soft power instruments such as assuming a mediator role in 
regional conflicts" to promote peace in its surrounding region.
9
 Turkey’s foreign aid 
program began in June 1985 with a 10 million USD aid package distributed to Gambia, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, Somalia and Sudan. Later in the 1980’s 
Turkey began to focus its attention on newly independent states in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. In 1992, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency 
(TIKA) was established to implement Turkey’s development cooperation policy: 
coordinate with national actors, international organizations and bilateral donors. 
According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, an important aspect of Turkey’s 
development policy is its demand-driven nature: Turkey delivers aid based on recipient 
country requests, often in sectors ‘such as education, health, water and sanitation, 
administrative and civil infrastructures which represent basic needs of people.’ 10 
Another key component is the Turkish Overseas Development Assistance policy that 
                                                          
6
 Davutoğlu , Ahmet. (2010). Turkey's zero problems foreign policy. Foreign Policy 
magazine. Retrieved on 10 January 2014.  
7
 Candar, C. (2009). Turkey’s ‘ Soft Power’ Strategy: A New Vision for a Multi-Polar 
World. Ankara SETA Policy Brief  p.9-10 
8
  Republic of Turkey-Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.). Turkey’s Development 
Cooperation: General Characteristics And The Least Developed Countries ( LDC) 
Aspect. Retrieved on 20 July 2014.  
9
 Ibid 
10
 Ibid 
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focuses on the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), to which Turkey plans to give a total 
of 200 million USD annually starting in 2012.
11
 In fact, Turkey gave 337 million USD 
to LDCs in 2012.
12
 In 2013, Turkey increased its aid to developing countries by 29.7%, 
which also reflects aid to Syria.
13
 
In the 2000s Turkey began to focusing increasingly on Africa: it was admitted to 
the African Union as an ‘observer’ in 2002 and TIKA opened its first offices on the 
continent in 2005. By 2006 Turkey’s official development assistance flows to Africa 
reached 51.73 million USD and in 2008, the African Union declared Turkey a ‘Strategic 
Partner’. However as of 2009 the bulk of ODA was still going to countries in South and 
Central Asia (almost 45%), the Balkan and Eastern European countries (nearly 27%), 
and lastly, African and Middle Eastern countries (nearly 25%).
14
 Among the African 
countries, Egypt received the most aid in 2012 with a little over one billion dollars, 
followed by Somalia with 86.6 million, and Sudan and Tunisia with slightly over 60 
million each.
15
 No other African country broke the top 18 countries receiving Turkish 
aid; Comoros is the next-largest African aid recipient with only 4.08 million.
16
 In 
addition to development aid, trade with Africa has become increasingly important. 
Bilateral trade volume with Africa reached 23.4 billion USD in 2013; 7.5 billion of 
which is with Sub-Saharan Africa.
17
 Turkey also provides around 500 educational 
scholarships for African students to study in Turkey every year; has trained 200 African 
junior diplomats through the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
                                                          
11
 Ibid.  
12
 Today's Zaman. (2013). Turkey fourth largest donor of foreign aid.. Retrieved on 3 
January 2014.  
13
 OECD. (2014). Aid to developing countries rebounds in 2013 to reach an all-time 
high. Retrieved 1 September 2014.  
14
 Ibid 
15
 Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA). (2013). Turkish Development 
Assistance 2012.  
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.). Turkey-Africa Relations. 
Retrieved on 23 July 2014.  
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since 1992; and provided 21,953 people in Africa with health checks, treatment, or 
medicine in 2013 alone.
18
  
 
 
2.2 Differing views on Turkish Foreign Policy Orientation 
 
 
Scholars differ on some key characteristics of Turkish Foreign Policy, especially 
when specifically discussing humanitarian aid. In 2012 Bayer and Keyman offered an 
overall glowing view of Turkish humanitarian development capacity and motives, and 
claimed that Turkey was deeply committed to multilateralism in its approach.
19
 They, 
along with Çandar, counteracted the common criticism that Turkey was moving away 
from the West and focusing more on the Middle East by pointing to the shifting balance 
of global power away from the West, thus explaining the increasing importance of the 
Middle East and Asia to many global actors. Bayer and Keyman (2012) identified 
Turkey’s increasing importance as a source of global humanitarian aid as a consequence 
of shifting hegemonies, and ‘massive shifts in the balance of North and South, East and 
West.’20 On the other hand, Onis claimed that there was merit in the criticism that the 
orientation of Turkish foreign policy had undergone some subtle shifts in the last 
decade, while Turkey started to operate less multilaterally and more independently.
21
 
However, even he does not accept the stereotype that Turkey has experienced a 
                                                          
18
 Ibid.  
19
  Bayer, R. & Keyman E.F. (2012). Turkey: An Emerging Hub of Globalization and 
Internationalist Humanitarian Actor? Globalizations, p. 37-41 
20
 Ibid p.75 
21
 Onis, Z. (2010).  Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying 
Dynamics And A Critique. Istanbul GLODEM Working Paper Series p.1-20. 
8 
 
complete rupture with its previous policy course: it is still more in line with the West 
than not.
22
 
Now, we must conceptualize what Turkey is doing in Somalia and Syria with 
conflict resolution literature. Since Turkey's actions are so broad, it is difficult to fit 
them under a label such as "development aid" or "humanitarian intervention". However, 
some concepts are important to contextualize Turkey's efforts.  After reviewing the 
concepts of "humanitarian intervention" and "mediation" we may gain a better 
understanding of how Turkey's efforts fit into or challenge international norms of 
conflict resolution.  
 
 
2.3 Humanitarian intervention 
 
 
 To determine whether Turkey's actions in Somalia and Syria constitute 
humanitarian intervention, we must first define the term. This task is more difficult than 
it seems since scholars have been debating the definition since the concept was first 
considered in the 1980's. Holzgrefe and Keohane define it as  
the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) 
aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the 
fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the 
permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.
23
  
Holzgrefe and Keohane also acknowledge that the definition in a legal sense (as cited in 
law reviews) may also include the threat or use of economic, diplomatic, and other 
sanctions; in other words, non-forcible or non-military interventions. On the other hand, 
                                                          
22
 Ibid 
23
 Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane, R. (2003). Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, 
and Political Dilemmas. Cambridge University Press: UK. P. 18.   
9 
 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse reformulate the definition to distinguish between forcible 
and non-forcible intervention: 
humanitarian intervention means cross-border action by the international 
community in response to human suffering, made up of (i) 'forcible 
humanitarian intervention', an expanded version of the classic concept to include 
collective action as well as self-help and no longer confined to human rights 
abuse by governments, and (ii) 'non-forcible humanitarian intervention'.
24
  
This definition acknowledges the reality that increasingly, forcible military intervention 
is only used to secure the conditions for other types of aid, and avoids approaching 
intervention from an 'all or nothing' mentality of requiring the use of military force 
before being able to label an action 'humanitarian intervention'. Yet other authors such 
as Teson describe a continuum of international response to conflict, whereas, "most of 
the reasons that justify humanitarian intervention are extensions of the general reasons 
that justify interference with agents in order to help victims of their unjust behavior."
25
 
 Humanitarian intervention rose to the forefront of scholars', practitioners', and 
diplomats' concerns around 1999, when Kofi Annan called on the international 
community to ensure that massive violations of human rights would never again be 
tolerated.
26
 However, the United Nations has repeatedly been stymied in its attempts to 
intervene in such conflicts due to the voting structure of the Security Council, which 
must authorize such interventions and is shackled by the veto power that the five 
permanent members wield. Furthermore, intervention efforts have historically needed 
two things: backing of the United States and legitimization of the UN Security 
Council.
27
 Somalia is an example of a conflict where both requirements were present, 
                                                          
24
 Ramsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (1996). Humanitarian Intervention in 
Contemporary Conflict: A reconceptualization. Polity Press: UK. p. 114.  
25
 Teson, F. (2003). The liberal case for humanitarian intervention. In Holzgrefe, J.L. 
and Keohane, R. (2003). Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political 
Dilemmas. (p. 93-129). Cambridge University Press: UK.   
26
 Annan, K. (1999). Address to the 54th session of the UN General Assembly. in 
Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane, R. (2003). Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and 
Political Dilemmas. (p. 233). Cambridge University Press: UK 
27
 Ramsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (1996). Humanitarian Intervention in 
Contemporary Conflict: A reconceptualization. (p. 158). Polity Press: UK.  
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while Syria is an example of one essentially lacking in US support or Security Council 
authorization for intervention. How concerned countries such as Turkey have reacted to 
the Syrian conflict despite the lack of international support for intervention will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters.  
 Turkey's efforts in Somalia and Syria cannot be labeled humanitarian 
intervention in the classic sense, since the Turkish military has so far not become 
involved in the conflicts other than to protect the border with Syria or protect the 
Turkish embassy in Somalia. However, Turkey's efforts in Syria may be called 
'interference' as Teson describes it, or may fall under the catch-all of 'non-forcible 
intervention' that Ramsbotham and Woodhouse advocate; while in Somalia, Turkey's 
actions are further away from humanitarian intervention and more akin to development 
aid. Some of the Prime Minister's statements about the Syrian conflict which will be 
discussed later are interesting because they point to the desire for humanitarian 
intervention, which Turkey has so far been unwilling or unable to do alone, and unable 
to convince either the U.S. or Security Council to support. In both situations, Turkey 
has added another element to its engagement with parties in the conflict: mediation. 
Turkey has used mediation in interesting ways in Syria, as it mediates between the 
opposition groups and the international community, and among the opposition groups 
themselves. In Somalia, Turkey has parlayed its growing relationship with the Somali 
government to mediate between it and Somaliland. In both contexts, Turkey has 
maintained that mediation is only a small part of its broader strategy of engagement, 
development, and relationship-building efforts.  
 
 
2.4 Mediation: definition and practice 
 
 
 Mediation is a practice of resolving disputes that dates from ancient times. 
Recently, it has been one of the key pillars of conflict resolution theory and practice. 
Despite mediation's importance, scholars and practitioners were historically hesitant to 
11 
 
study its variables in detail or even acknowledge that it was susceptible to systematic 
analysis.
28
 Today, mediation is more carefully studied and defined. Bercovitch and 
Rubin state that a characteristic of mediation is that it "is a voluntary form of 
intervention. This means the parties retain their control over the outcome (if not always 
the process) of their dispute, as well as their freedom to accept or reject mediation or 
mediator's proposals."
29
 The same authors define mediation as  
a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own 
efforts, where the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance, or 
accept an offer of help, from an individual, group, state or organization to 
change, affect or influence their perceptions or behavior, without resorting to 
physical force or invoking the authority of the law.
30
 
This definition is broad but still focuses on the negotiation process, while other 
definitions encompass other "interactions", such as James Laue's definition of a 
mediator as assisting "the parties in their negotiations or other problem-solving 
interaction"
31
 or Christopher Mitchell's definition of mediation as "intermediary 
activity…undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of achieving some 
compromise settlement of the issues at stake between the parties, or at least ending 
disruptive conflict behavior". 
32
 In their edited volume on multiparty mediation, 
Crocker, Hampson, and Aall acknowledge that settling upon one definition of mediation 
                                                          
28
 Bercovitch, J. and Rubin, Z. (1992). Mediation in International Relations: Multiple 
approaches to conflict management. Macmillan Press: Great Britain.  
29
 Ibid p. 5 
30
 Ibid p. 7 
31
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is difficult since the practice continually evolves due to changing circumstances.
33
 They 
cite an example of an NGO which uses education, persuasion, and resources to "play a 
pivotal role in inducing local agencies to implement portions of a peace treaty."
34
 Here, 
we see a range of definitions for mediation focusing on the involvement of a third party 
but encompassing either actual negotiation processes or simply the interaction or 
"intermediary activity" of the third party; most importantly, we see the acknowledgment 
by scholars that mediation is an evolving concept, with the possibility of its definition 
evolving too. The idea of evolving mediation definitions and strategies is important 
since, as we will see, Turkey's actions in Somalia and Syria indicate the possibility of a 
new form of mediation, or at the least, a new way of incorporating mediating activities 
into a broader strategy of interference in violent conflicts.  
 Another aspect of mediation that must be considered is its ethics. When a 
mediator intervenes, it is in the interest of achieving a particular outcome. Depending on 
the level of involvement, ranging from simply providing good offices to choosing the 
parties and issues up for mediation, the mediator may have significant influence on the 
conflict dynamics. In some cases, mediation may prolong a conflict or focus the parties 
on achieving a certain outcome when another outcome may actually be in their best 
interests.
35
 In his seminal paper on Turkey's mediation efforts, Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu  identifies impartiality as an ethical duty of a mediator, who should be the 
"defender of shared values" in the process.
36
 He further identifies honesty in dealings 
with both parties, neutrality, and objectivity as important ethical considerations in 
mediation.   
 Another important factor is the type of mediator.  Mediators may be biased, 
which is to say that they have a stake in the conflict and are closer to one side than the 
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other, or they may be impartial, which means they are neutral parties in the conflict and 
can provide a balanced perspective.
37
 A slew of research indicates that mediators must 
be impartial or neutral in order to mediate effectively; one of the most well-known 
researchers to espouse this idea is Bercovitch, who reiterated it once again recently.
38
 
On the other hand, some researchers acknowledge that interested or biased mediators 
can also be effective under the right circumstances.
39
 This perspective has been gaining 
traction in recent research; for example, Wing claims that mediator bias is a natural 
characteristic which should not be discredited, while several other researchers 
emphasize that biased mediators have the capacity to bring about successful 
agreements.
40
 Beardsley qualifies that biased mediators can be effective under certain 
conditions, such as when one party faces resistance from their constituents and can 
show the biased mediator as someone more likely to help them reach a favorable 
agreement.
41
 One other quality of the mediator should be mentioned, which is the type 
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of actor who mediates. Mediation may be undertaken by a variety of actors such as 
private individuals, scholar/practitioners, formal individuals, regional organizations, 
transnational organizations, international organizations, small states, or superpowers.
42
 
Turkey may be considered a small state mediator, in contrast to a superpower mediator. 
Randa Slim demonstrates that small states' power in the mediation process stems from 
their good relations with all parties involved, and the fact that they appear sympathetic 
to the weaker party and non-threatening to the stronger.
43
 The ability of small states to 
mediate in large conflicts has interesting implications for how this research on Turkey's 
mediation efforts in Syria and Somalia may be more broadly applicable to small state 
mediation efforts in general.  
 
 
2.5 Turkey's vision of Mediation 
 
 
Looking at mediation specifically, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Ahmet Davutoğlu defined the "fundamental parameters of a mediation process as being 
(1) confidence building among parties, (2) sustaining a value-based process, (3) laying 
out a clear vision for the future and (4) providing the necessary diplomatic 
instruments."
44
 During the same speech at a 2011 high-level retreat for members of the 
UN Security Council held in Istanbul, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet 
Davutoğlu referred to ‘diplomacy and mediation as ultimate instruments for peace’ and 
the UN Security Council as the ‘backbone’ of such instruments along with regional 
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organizations such as the African Union and the Arab League.
45
 These statements 
clearly lay out Turkey’s conception of mediation as a process along with Turkey’s 
vision for those who should engage it: the UN along with the appropriate regional 
organization. 
The Directorate General for Policy Planning of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ufuk Gezer, outlined four important points about Turkey’s mediation strategy 
and why Turkey believes itself to be a good mediator: 
1. Turkey considers itself as an ‘insider mediator’ because it is 
generally directly or indirectly affected by the conflicts in which it attempts to 
mediate. 
2. The human ties between Turkey and the countries in which it 
mediates give it an innate understanding of the conflict. 
3. Conflicts today are increasingly within rather than between states, 
making them even more difficult to understand for outsiders (and consequently, 
making Turkey’s ‘insider’ position even more valuable). 
4. Mediation is not a one –off event. It takes long-term 
commitment, which Turkey can afford.
46
 
Importantly, Turkey’s vision of mediation includes much more than just 
traditional, high-level mediation techniques. Aras (2012) called the concept of foreign 
policy championed by Ahmet Davutoğlu ‘total performance’ and stated that ‘ it aimed 
to mobilize civil society, universities, NGOs and others behind foreign policy…[ and] 
had found its most substantial manifestation in Turkey’s growing mediation efforts 
outside its borders.’47 In other words, a variety of civil society actors is responsible for, 
and contributes to, Turkey’s foreign policy efforts, especially in the area of mediation. 
Turkey’s mediation efforts often benefit from NGOs’ activities for humanitarian help 
and business involvement in infrastructural development in the conflicts in which 
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Turkey seeks to mediate.
48
 Fidan (2013) called these humanitarian and business actors 
the new instruments of Turkish Foreign Policy makers, stating that ‘Turkey’s soft power 
comprised among other things, cultural diplomacy, development assistance and 
mediation services.
 49
 Rather than attempting to simply mediate a conflict among top-
level leaders, Turkish NGOs and business activity create goodwill which paves the way 
for the Turkish Foreign Ministry to be perceived as a legitimate actor by many segments 
of society. 
Some observers have questioned whether Turkey is seeking to develop a new 
form of mediation, perhaps one less beholden to the traditional Western definition and 
expectations. These observers point to the fact that Turkey rarely conducts traditional 
mediation in isolation of other efforts such as development and humanitarian aid, as we 
will see in the discussion about Somalia. The insistence on combining mediation with 
these other development activities might be a sign that Turkey is moving away from the 
traditional Western conception of an impartial mediator towards its own definition, one 
that includes direct assistance to the parties in need throughout and even before, the 
mediation process. However, Bülent Aras rejects the idea that Turkey is ‘departing from 
the Western course of mediation’. As he explains "There is this notion of ‘Western’ 
liberal values and democracy in the genesis of Turkish policy. India may do it (move 
away from Western influence) since they have a legacy of anti-colonialism. They do not 
have any long-term alliance with the West. Brazil, South Africa and China may all be in 
a similar position, but Turkey has not placed itself historically, culturally or 
ideologically, as anti-Western. There is an intrinsic West in Turkey’s policy 
framework."
50
 At the same time, he acknowledges that:  
The UN Guidelines for Effective Mediation is not in of itself sufficient in 
dealing with the new challenges of an era of global turmoil. There is a need for a 
wider plurality of perspectives. The broad international acceptance of Turkey’s 
mediation framework and the transformation of the current mediation practices 
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and structures of the UN will be a long and difficult process. Turkey’s main 
challenge in this regard will be in dealing with resistance from entrenched 
mediation mechanisms, structures and actors.
51
 
Turkey has had some issues to resolve in order to be perceived as a more 
effective mediator. Internal problems, such as the lack of resolution regarding the 
Kurdish conflict and poor relations with neighbors, such as with Israel and Armenia, 
threatened Turkey’s legitimacy as a mediator.52 However, Turkey has made mediation a 
central platform of its foreign policy agenda, founding the Mediation and Friends of 
Mediation initiative with the government of Finland; hosting the first, second, and third 
Istanbul Conferences on Mediation, and pushing for the United Nations and regional 
organizations to use mediation more effectively for intervention in violent conflicts. 
Turkey takes the opportunity to mediate when it can, but as its actions in Somalia and 
Syria demonstrate, mediation is not a one-off process but part of a broader effort at 
engagement, humanitarian and development aid, political dialogue, economic 
investment, and other methods that engage all levels of society.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
3.1 Comparative case study 
 
 
Since my goal is to describe Turkey's actions in Somalia and Syria, and 
specifically, instances of mediation, then compare the two cases to discover some 
indications of Turkish mediation capability and soft power, my research method is the 
comparative case study. I define the case study according to Yin as "an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident."
53
 I approach both cases holistically, examining them in depth but not breaking 
up my analysis into smaller embedded units. Several scholars have argued that 
comparative case studies, sometimes called multiple case studies, can allow for stronger 
analysis and make a start toward replicating the results of the case study for wider 
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validity.
54
 Rather than simply focusing on one of the two cases, I have chosen both in 
order to see Turkish actions in two contrasting conflicts. 
I selected the cases of Turkish involvement in Syria and Somalia in order to 
examine contrasting cases, sometimes called least similar cases. According to Yin, 
deliberately selecting contrasting cases and analyzing how the contrasts lead to different 
results in a predictable manner strengthens the external validity of the study and is a 
start toward theoretical replication.
55
 Though there are some similarities to the two 
conflicts; most importantly, the fact that both are protracted social conflicts, there are 
far more differences which will become clear in the subsequent analysis of each conflict 
through Wehr's conflict map. One key difference is the motivation for Turkey's 
involvement in the conflicts: while Turkey purposefully became active in Somalia in 
order to establish a foothold in Africa for economic development and trade, and display 
the success of Turkish soft power in the region, Turkey was practically forced to 
become involved in the Syrian conflict due to its 900 kilometer border and the shared 
cultural, familial, and economic connections between the border cities. Notably, in both 
conflicts Turkey was also motivated to prevent civilian deaths. Another important 
difference is that violence in the Syrian conflict is escalating while it is de-escalating in 
Somalia, meaning that Turkish involvement in Somalia can be more robust and involve 
a wider variety of actors than in Syria, where Turkey is necessarily limited due to the 
violence. Turkey's history with the two countries is also different; while Syria was part 
of the Ottoman Empire until after World War I, Somalia was never part of the Ottoman 
Empire, though it did receive assistance from the Ottomans as will be described in detail 
in the subsequent chapter.  
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3.2 The case study's unique suitability for researching contemporary conflict 
 
 
A case study is primarily (but not always exclusively) concerned with qualitative 
methods. The strength of qualitative methods is their ability to take the researcher on a 
search for meaning and allow for greater flexibility in pursuing evidence. For case study 
researchers in particular, all evidence is of value, but determining its worth and 
trustworthiness is of utmost importance. Gillham identifies five types of research that 
qualitative methods allow for; several of them are particularly relevant to this thesis: 
1. To carry out an investigation where other methods- such as 
experiments- are either not practicable or not ethically justifiable. 
2. To investigate situations where little is known about what is there 
or what is going on. More formal research may come later. 
3. To explore complexities that are beyond the scope of more 
‘controlled’ approaches. 
4. To ‘get under the skin’ of a group or organization to find out 
what really happens - the informal reality which can only be perceived from the 
inside. 
5. To carry out research into the processes leading to results… 
rather than into the ‘significance’ of the results themselves.56 
This method is particularly salient to investigation of an ongoing conflict, when 
the facts change from day-to-day and the cast of actors is constantly in flux. In this case, 
conducting an experiment or approaching the conflict with a more ‘controlled’ method 
in order to illuminate Turkey’s intervention strategy would be impossible due to the 
confidential nature of the ongoing intervention efforts. Gillham’s second point is 
especially relevant, since very little is currently known about the Syrian conflict beyond 
what is reported in the mainstream and social media networks. More formal research 
can be conducted in the future after the conflict de-escalates and researchers have access 
to more reliable data. Yin agrees that the case study methodology is "preferred in 
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examining contemporary events, but when the relevant behaviors cannot be 
manipulated."
57
  
According to Gillham ‘the case study researcher, working inductively from 
what’s there in the research setting develops grounded theory: theory that is grounded in 
the evidence that is turned up.’ In other words, case study research necessitates 
gathering evidence and examining it closely before attempting to impose a theory or 
draw conclusions. Even after the researcher reaches a theory, she should be constantly 
willing to revise or rethink the theory based on new evidence. Thus, I first conducted 
research on the Syria and Somalia conflicts and resulting Turkish intervention before 
attempting to look at Turkish Foreign Policy more broadly and draw conclusions about 
Turkey’s general intervention strategy from the two cases. Throughout the research and 
writing process I constantly questioned my conclusions, which was especially important 
given the evolving nature of the conflict and new evidence that continually comes to 
light. In 2003 Verschuren specified that this type of research followed an iterative-
parallel research strategy whereby the researcher "carries out many different research 
activities in an unplanned, whimsical order" and where "what is found in a later stage of 
the research is used to reshape earlier stages of the research project."
58
 For example the 
information I gained from my elite interviews was used to formulate my research 
questions and led me to gather additional evidence.  
 
 
3.3 Evidence 
 
 
I gathered evidence from a variety of sources, including primary sources such as 
news articles, first-hand accounts, speeches, press releases and conference discussions; 
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secondary sources such as books, published academic articles, unpublished reports and 
second-hand accounts and interviews. Interviews can be a difficult source of 
information because people can be sincere and willing to help, but mistaken, or they can 
actively seek to deceive the interviewer. For this reason, triangulation or gathering 
evidence from a variety of different sources and finding different perspectives was an 
important part of my research process. I utilized four open-ended, face-to-face, elite 
interviews to gather data from key informants. Woodside (2010) defined key informants 
as "persons with special knowledge or are members of a specific sub-population of 
immense interest to the researcher or strategist."
59
  A strength of face-to-face interviews 
is the ability to clarify questions, ask follow-up questions and gain a richness and depth 
to the information. According to Gillham, elite interviews are those conducted with 
people in a position of authority and have a few special characteristics, several of which 
are relevant to this research: 
1. They will know more about the topic and the setting than you do: 
to a large extent they can tell you what questions you should be asking, what 
you need to know. 
2. By virtue of their authority and experience they will have their 
own structuring of their knowledge. They will not tamely submit to being 
interviewed where you direct a series of questions at them. 
3. The best you can hope for is that you will raise topics that they 
will respond to. 
4. They will expect to have some control over what you do, and will 
usually demand a level of accountability and reporting back. If you can accept 
that, they, in return, can be important ‘facilitators’.60 
Other sources term this type of interview a ‘long interview’.  Woodside (2010) 
listed several characteristics of long interviews, which include interviewing the 
respondent in his/her life space for a period of several hours, asking open-ended 
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questions, recording responses, verifying responses by triangulation of research 
methods, and developing thick descriptions of individual cases.
61
 
Most of these specifications were followed in my interviews, although all but 
one interview was less than two hours. The interviews occurred in the ‘life space’ of my 
interviewees. Bülent Aras was interviewed in the Istanbul Policy Center where he 
frequently works and lectures, Hugh Pope was interviewed in his office at the 
International Crisis Group, Ufuk Gezer was interviewed in his office at the Turkish 
Foreign Ministry and Ertuğral Apakan was interviewed in his office at Yaşar 
University. Most questions were open-ended and allowed the interviewees to explain 
their answers in detail. All interviews were tape recorded. Since interviews were only a 
small fraction of my research I was able to find data from a variety of sources, as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter. In particular, Hugh Pope from International Crisis 
Group provided a much different perspective than Bülent Aras and Ufuk Gezer, who 
both work for the Turkish Government, while Ertuğral Apakan was the most reluctant 
to speak, perhaps reflecting his background as a diplomat. 
 
 
3.4 Benefits and Criticisms 
 
 
Many researchers have catalogued the criticisms of the case study method in an 
effort to disprove them. Verschuren (2003) pointed out that the most frequent criticisms 
of the case study method are the following: a) its ability to easily lead to researcher bias 
due to the researcher’s close involvement with the research methods (such as open 
interviews), b) its internal validity and c) its low generalizability since only one or two 
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cases are studied.
62
 Perhaps the most adamant criticism comes from Tight when he 
stated that the case study is "a convenient label for our research-when we can’t think of 
anything ‘better’- in an attempt to give it some added respectability."63 However these 
criticisms are from a reductionist viewpoint and do not allow for the unique 
contributions that case studies, when properly performed, can bring to the subject under 
study. 
Verschuren (2003) also dissected these criticisms by pointing out that a) bias and 
potential for manipulation of data or results is more dependent on the researcher than 
the research method b) each method carries the risk of being manipulated by a skilled 
researcher, c) internal validity can be strengthened in the case study method by using 
triangulation or gathering evidence from multiple perspectives and a variety of sources, 
d) a case study is by nature a holistic look at a single case or comparison of multiple 
cases which does not seek to reduce research units into observation units.
64
 Therefore, 
larger units of complexity lend themselves more easily to comparison than smaller units 
and variables. For example, I examine Turkish intervention efforts in Syria and Somalia 
not by breaking up each intervention into a separate observation unit and attempting to 
quantitatively analyze each move made by the Turkish interveners, but by approaching 
the entire case of the conflict in each country and subsequent Turkish interventions as a 
whole. This approach allows me to investigate the relationship between Turkish moves 
and subsequent changes in the conflict environment: it emphasizes the process of 
intervention as whole rather than discreet occurrences. 
Ultimately, this comparative case study serves two aims. It describes Turkey’s 
ongoing involvement in Somalia and Syria in more detail and takes this description 
further by comparing these specific cases to gain insight into Turkey’s overall 
intervention strategy, specifically mediation. Tight's (2010) criticism mentioned above 
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does not leave room for the possibility that a case study is sometimes the only way to 
describe situations of significance to the academic community (by providing an outlet 
for initial research into ongoing conflicts, for example) and gives the researcher the 
opportunity to explore one or at most, a few cases in depth and holistically, without 
being bound by smaller units of analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
SOMALIA 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
 Somalia was among the African countries to receive Turkey's first aid package 
in 1985, and is now a centerpiece of Turkey's foreign aid program and a demonstration 
of the effectiveness of its soft power. Providing aid to Somalia fits neatly within 
Turkey's stated policy of focusing aid on countries that have requested it, and in sectors 
that meet the basic needs of people, such as water, health, sanitation, and infrastructure. 
The following sections will discuss the conflict in Somalia and provide a 
comprehensive overview of Turkey's involvement in the country. After this discussion, 
we are better placed to analyze how Turkey's work in Somalia fits into its broader 
strategy of humanitarian intervention and mediation, and why Somalia provides a 
26 
 
particularly good example of how Turkey can use its soft power, development aid, and 
mediation capacity to positively influence regional conflicts.   
 
 
4.2 Conflict history 
 
 
Somalia’s problems are generally traced only as far back as 1991, when General 
Mohammed Siyad Barre, who led Somalia since 1969, was overthrown by rebels. This 
does mark an important turning point for the nation, but is not sufficient to understand 
Somalia’s background of chaos and conflict. To gain a clearer picture of the country and 
people, we should look at its colonization and the origins of its many factions. The 
people of Somalia were historically divided into pastoralist clans, which were further 
subdivided into small divisions and scattered throughout the country in nomadic 
groups.
65
 The two main ethnic groups were the Samale and Sab: the former divided 
further into the large clan-families Dir, Isaq, Hawiye and Darod which were all 
primarily pastoral nomads.
66
 The Sab people were less numerous and had two main 
divisions, the Digil and Rahanweyn, both cultivators rather than nomads.
67
 In addition 
to those groups there were smaller ethnic communities such as Arab and Asian 
immigrants.   
Within those clan-families, smaller clans formed political units loosely led by 
elders who had very little power: the Somali people were extremely democratic almost 
to the point of anarchy.
68
 Within clans there were even smaller groups called diya-
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paying groups, whose members willingly entered into alliance with each other to pay 
and receive compensation for any wrongs committed by or against the group.
69
 
Somalia’s historic background of warning clans with very little internal 
governance contributed to the brutality of the 1990’s and 2000’s, when rival militias 
consisting of clan members would vie for control of the country. The foreign nature of 
centralized government would also contribute to the difficulty that the international 
community faced when attempting to install a transitional national government in 2000. 
The region has a history of violence. In the mid-1500’s Somali nomads attacked 
Christian Abyssinians living in the same region and received help from the Ottoman 
Empire.
70
 This marks the starting point of Turkish presence in the region: in 1557 the 
Ottomans briefly occupied what is now Eritrea but were unable to extend their 
territory.
71
 The Ottomans re-appeared in the region again in 1866 when Egypt attempted 
to revive claims to the Red Sea Coast, including the Somali Coast.
72
 At same time, 
Britain, France and Italy began to compete for colonization of the region including 
Somalia. Britain formally entered Somalia in 1884 in an attempt to establish order in the 
country to ensure safe trade routes, since Somalis were seen as incapable of establishing 
order themselves.
73
 Ethiopia also claimed Somali-inhabited territories and ruled over 
Western Somalia from 1887-1897. The Ethiopians were unable to administer their 
territory as effectively as the Europeans and thus the first Somali resistance to 
colonization was against them. The resulting ‘Dervish Wars’ which lasted from 1900-
1920 against Ethiopian, British and Italian colonizers left the country with depleted 
foreign funds and crumbling infrastructure.
74
 The Dervish Wars did not result in Somali 
independence and the region remained colonized or ‘administrated’ in some form until 
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1960, when the British and Italian administrated regions combined to form independent 
Somalia. 
Now that the Northern and Southern parts of Somalia were united the 
government was faced with how to address the other Somali territories which were 
occupied by Kenya and Ethiopia. Fighting broke out between Somalia and the two 
neighboring countries in 1960 but relations began to improve by 1969, which was also 
the year when fraud and a poorly structured voting system left Somalia with a one-party 
government. 
The military, becoming increasingly irrelevant due to the emerging peace, along 
with intellectuals and the police, was dissatisfied with the election results and the 
increasing authoritarianism and corruption of the government led by President Igal. 
Catalyzed by the President’s murder, a group of army officers staged a coup during 
talks to appoint a new President in October 1969.
75
 The military established a Supreme 
Revolutionary Council and renamed the state the Somali Democratic Republic, 
promising to work toward unification with the other ethnic Somali territories. Its 
President was General Muhammad Siyad Barre. War eventually erupted with Somalia 
and Ethiopian-controlled Somali territory, which led to the Barre Government issuing 
large amounts of arms to the civilian population.
76
 It also brought roughly 700,000 
refugees to the small country, causing friction with some of the clans and destabilizing 
the Northern region.
77
 
The Barre Regime manipulated kinship relations for its own benefit and 
randomly imprisoned government officials if the President believed that they were 
gaining too much power.
78
 The regime eventually ceased to function effectively while 
the economy never improved from its reliance on foreign aid and paltry livestock 
exports. Clans began to fight one another while the Barre Regime distributed money 
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and arms to mobilize clan groups that still remained friendly to the government.
79
 By 
1990 foreign aid had dried up due to pressure from human rights groups monitoring the 
oppression in Somalia and the economy was ruined: opposition to the Barre Regime 
was at its peak. President Barre was finally driven from Mogadishu in January 1991 by 
a coalition called the United Somali Congress led by a former army officer.
80
 Somalia 
descended into civil was as clans vied for control of the country, facilitated by the 
weapons that Barre had distributed and those provided by Ethiopia. In the South, 
peaceful cultivators were forced to flee the violent militias, leading to waves of 
migration and starvation.
81
 The North was more peaceful than the South: in 1991 
Somaliland officially declared its independence from Somalia through it remains 
unrecognized internationally. The International Community began to show interest in 
Somalia in 1992 but could not deliver aid without dealing with hostile militias. 
Therefore, the United Nations authorized the deployment of 50 observers to Mogadishu 
in April 1992.
82
 
The U.N. needed U.S. support to intervene effectively. President George H.W. 
Bush agreed and subsequently in December 1992, UN Resolution 794 authorized a 
humanitarian operation in Somalia without receiving an invitation to intervene from any 
of the parties in the conflict. 33,000 UNITAF personnel participated in ‘Operation 
Restore Hope’ which combined with the previous UNISOM force. The UN attempted to 
form a Transitional National Council but it was not accepted by all the factions in 
Mogadishu and the surrounding areas.
83
 By June 1993 UN forces in Mogadishu 
commanded by Admiral Howe were in all-out war with a militia led by the war lord 
‘Aideed’.84  The resulting violence has been forever etched on Western minds and in 
history due to the fateful ‘Black Hawk Down’ mission which culminated in the deaths 
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of 18 American soldiers and effectively crushed international will for intervention. 
Thanks to the significant media attention the deaths garnered and the sense of outrage 
that ensued, Western nations who were already anxious to cut and run from the 
continent and its seemingly intractable problems were given the perfect opportunity to 
reduce their commitment in Somalia and the entire continent until they were an almost 
non-existent presence, which remained the case for over two decades. 
 In the aftermath of "Black Hawk Down," the UN hastily attempted to create any 
kind of government that they could but withdrew without success in March 1995.
85
 At 
the same time, the collapse of the government and its failure to provide basic social 
services encouraged the growth of Islamic facilities and strengthened the fundamentalist 
trends in society.
86
 In 2000 the UN again attempted to establish a Transitional National 
Government (TNG) by hosting a conference in Arta but it was not very successful. The 
newly established government could barely control Mogadishu, much less the rest of the 
country. Many of its leaders were illiterate and after two years its main achievement 
was forming a clan-based militia.
87
 Education lost its value in Somali society because 
the only way to get ahead was the use of force. However, the UN continued to claim the 
TNG as a legitimate government internationally in order to bolster its own state building 
credentials.
88
 
 In 2004 another Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established in 
Nairobi but once again failed to gain widespread support. Instead, it generated fierce 
opposition in Mogadishu where the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and its militant youth 
wing, the Al-Shabaab began to carry out acts of violence against the TFG and its 
supporters in 2006. In response to the prospect of Islamic terrorist groups gaining 
further momentum in Somalia, the United States mobilized Somali militias to 
counteract the extremists, with CIA backing. Perceived foreign intervention enraged 
various parties in the conflict such as clan leaders, the business community, and the 
ICU. This resulted in the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC) gaining control of 
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Mogadishu. The SCIC ruled with an increasingly authoritarian and extremist nature, 
eventually banning things such as music, political gatherings, and foreign films. It 
became clear that the Shabaab were the ones in power in the organization, and their 
hostile rhetoric toward Kenya and Ethiopia began to threaten regional stability. Thus, 
Ethiopia invaded Somalia in December 2006 and gained control of Mogadishu, 
returning it to the TFG. However, the Shabaab mounted resistance with support from 
foreign jihadists, including al-Qaeda. They were able to capture most of Southern 
Somalia but not the capital. Ethiopia's occupation of Mogadishu for over two years also 
coincided with a dark period of human rights violations including arrests, torture, rape, 
and general violence. Finally Ethiopia withdrew its troops in January 2009 after having 
failed to secure popular support for the TFG. After Ethiopia's withdrawal the Djibouti 
branch of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia joined with the TFG to form a 
unity government which elected a former SCIC leader, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, to 
the presidency and was dependent on AMISOM forces to maintain security.  
 
 
4.3 Conflict context 
 
 
 The period between 2009 and 2011 really set the stage for Turkey's involvement 
in Somalia today. The withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in 2009 meant that Somali 
insurgents who were once united against Ethiopia now turned on themselves, creating 
chaos. By May 2009, the TFG controlled only a small slice of Mogadishu and were 
struggling to maintain their tenuous hold on it. The mindset of the population and TFG 
was completely opposed, as politicians and elders in central Somalia called on the 
international community to stop meddling in Somalia's internal problems, and the 
Islamic Council accused the West of fueling hostility to prevent the formation of  stable 
country. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister of the TFG wrote an op-ed asking for more 
international support. The U.S. and UK agreed to intervene in 2010 due to the presence 
of Al-Qaeda in Somalia, and called the African Union's efforts there a failure when they 
failed to send the 8,000 peacekeepers they had originally pledged. Turkey's involvement 
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with Somalia really began in 2009 when it pledged to support Somalia security forces. 
Then, in 2010 it hosted an international conference on Somalia to discuss aid.  
 Meanwhile, the UN attempted to move back to Mogadishu in August 2010, but 
could not do it due to the ongoing violence. Later in April 2011, the Somali Prime 
Minister asked the UN to move back, but they still refused. During the same month, 90 
Ugandan soldiers were killed in Mogadishu. However, by July 2011 the UN had 
resumed food aid to Somalia due to the famine crisis. At the height of the famine, 3.2 
million Somalis were desperate for food, but insurgents prevented it from reaching 
them. In August 2011 the TFG partnered with moderate Islamic militias and AMISOM 
troops to rid the capital of Al-Shabaab insurgents. During the same month, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan made his seminal trip to Mogadishu and jump-started Turkey's 
involvement in the country. Just one month later, Turkey announced that it had 
collected $26 million in aid for Somalia. In November 2011, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, 
and Ethiopia all agreed to combine forces in an effort to fight Al-Shabaab.  
 
 
4.4 Conflict parties 
 
 
4.4.1 Primary 
 
The Al-Shabaab radical Islamist militia (aligned to al-Qaeda) is a consequence 
of Somalia's brutal history and failing of traditional political institutions. The SCIC 
destroyed organizations and processes in Somalia that traditionally maintained the last 
shred of social order, such as civil society organizations and neighborhood watch 
programs, leaving the Shabaab to take their place. They evolved out of the youth wing 
of the Union of Islamic Courts which was active in 2006 in Mogadishu and are mainly 
composed of youth who grew up during the turbulent 1990's when violence and force 
overtook education as the means of achieving success in society. When Ethiopia 
invaded Somalia in 2009 and drove the ICU out of Mogadishu, the international 
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community convinced several of its leaders to switch alliances and join the TFG. The 
second president of the Transitional Federal Government, Sharif Ahmed, was once 
connected to the ICU and his election seems to have catalyzed the Shabaab into fierce 
opposition against the government.
89
 This period was really the peak of Al-Shabaab's 
power; internal divisions, a backlash against its brutality, and the poor handling of the 
2011 famine all contributed to its waning influence.
90
 Today, Al-Shabaab is losing 
territory due to an AMISOM push in Spring 2014 to liberate wider areas of Somalia 
from their grasp, but they are by no means defeated. According to International Crisis 
Group, the most likely scenario for the group's future is that 
its armed units will retreat to smaller, remote and rural enclaves, exploiting 
entrenched and ever-changing clan-based competition; at the same time, other 
groups of radicalised and well-trained individuals will continue to carry out 
assassinations and terrorist attacks in urban areas, including increasingly in 
neighbouring countries, especially Kenya. 
91
 
Al-Shabaab is still very much a threat to Somalia and the region. The group's ability to 
adapt and change tactics along with the Somali people's inclination toward a very 
conservative interpretation of Sunni Islam are other factors in the group's favor. 
Furthermore, Al-Shabaab have thrived thus far thanks to a combination of the same core 
leadership group virtually since its founding, consistent declared objectives, and the 
ability its local presence has given it to become adept at grassroots political governance, 
especially at harnessing the clan rivalries to its advantage.
92
 It has been led since 2005 
by an emir, Ahmed Abdi “Godane,” who managed to hold onto power despite internal 
divisions and who made the decision to formally declare alliance with Al-Qaeda in 2012 
(Godane was killed by a U.S. airstrike in September 2014). Despite Al-Shabaab's 
decade of attacks in Somalia, it was perhaps the September 2013 attack on the Westgate 
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Mall in Nairobi which killed nearly 70 people that brought them the most international 
attention. Also since 2013, the group has acted more as a spoiler, utilizing tactics such 
as suicide bombings and grenades to prevent stability from taking hold in Somalia while 
endangering fewer fighters.
93
  The Crisis Group points out that Al-Shabaab taps into a 
more long-term trend toward conservatism in Somali society that will be hard to 
reverse, and though it is considered a problem by parts of Somali society, it is 
considered the solution by others. The benefits it offers certain segments of society 
include "mediating local clan disputes, improving religious education, providing basic 
services and institutionalising consultative bodies for local governance arrangements."
94
 
In order to counter these advantages, the Somali Federal Government and its supporters 
will have to work on the grassroots level too.  
The Federal Government of Somalia was established in August 2012 and is the 
first non-transitional government in Somalia since 1991. It continues to suffer from the 
same problems as the former Transitional Federal Government; some of its largest 
problems in addition to a lack of widespread legitimacy are how to structure parliament 
and how federalism will take root in Somalia, as reflected in the Transitional Federal 
Charter. The government is led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Prime 
Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon. The TFG was originally led by President Abdullahi Yusuf 
who established the government in Mogadishu and paved the way for the second 
president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed to complete the constitution and begin to 
transition the country to a federalist system. When the TFG's charter ran out in 2012 and 
their second request for an extension was denied, the Federal Government was 
established. According to a Somali news source, despite widespread belief that the 
elections for the new government were corrupt, people were ready for leadership:  
‘President Hassan Mohamoud was brought to power in a dubious and corrupt 
parliamentarian election. It was an open secret that parliament members were 
bribed into electing the candidates for Somali presidency. Professor Ahmed 
Samatar (2013) of Minnesota, a parliament member and a presidential candidate 
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repeatedly testified that the MPs were given cash to vote for the candidates. It 
just so happened that President Mohamoud had deeper pockets. In spite of the 
corruption and the open dishonesty of the election process, Somalis were ready 
and desperate for a change. Everywhere, Somalis were jubilant and celebrated 
for this supposed “new era.”95  
President Mohamoud's administration has faced swift criticism of exacerbating tribal 
divisions and tensions between the regions surrounding Somalia. A Somali think tank 
states that the government's intentions seem good, but its first 100 days shows a "mixed 
record characterized by a jarring imbalance between foreign and domestic policy 
priorities, slow response to economic and political crises, immodesty in rhetoric and, 
above all, an unhealthy imbalance between the presidency and the cabinet." 
96
 It is still 
too early to determine whether the Federal Government will succeed in gathering 
support and continuing the country's path to stability. Somalia's Deputy Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Jamal Mohamed Barrow, identified six areas of Somalia's development 
policy:  
1. Establish effective government structures and facilitate disarmament. The 
Judiciary is reviewing existing laws, training judges to respond to contemporary 
needs while utilizing mechanisms of traditional justice including Sharia law. The 
aim is for accountable, transparent institutions.  
2. Economic reform. The government's goals are vocational development, recovery 
of family income, focusing on women's labor, and applying the principles of the 
free market.  
3. Peacebuilding. The government's goal is social reconciliation through bridges of 
trust. Dialogue centers to facilitate social reconciliation are being established at 
local and national levels. Mediation will occur at the grassroots level with 
government playing the mediating role to reconcile between clans; the goal is to 
empower traditional leaders to facilitate the healing process.  
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4. Service delivery. The government recognizes service delivery as a vital part of 
reconciliation. Health, education, water, and sanitation services are vital for all 
citizens.  
5. International relations. Good relations with the international community can 
support recovery and the reconciliation process. The government is working to 
build diplomatic relations and believes that the African Union should be free of 
conflict.  
6. Unity & integrity. The government's largest challenge is integration of people 
which comes through trust-building in society. 
97
 
Turkey has a unique role to play in helping Somalia accomplish many, if not all, of 
these goals.  
 
 
4.4.2 Secondary parties 
 
Regional actors such as Ethiopia and Kenya have historically had significant 
interests in Somalia. Ethiopia is perceived as a potential threat to Somali independence 
since it colonized part of Somalia in the late 1800's. At the height of Ethiopia's 
occupation of Mogadishu in 2008 there were over 15,000 troops stationed in the capital, 
either from the Ethiopian army or Somali troops trained in Ethiopia.
98
 Somalia has also 
been the site of a proxy battle between Ethiopia and Eritrea, where "Eritrea allegedly 
funds and arms anti-Ethiopian Somali Sufi factions while Ethiopia reportedly arms pro-
Somali government militias."
99
 Turkey's lack of historic interest in the country has 
actually been compared favorably to Ethiopia's continual entanglement in Somalia's 
conflicts. Kenya sent 3,000 troops to Somalia in October 2011 in an effort to secure 
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their northern border, where violence was starting to decrease tourism to Kenya and 
destabilize the region.
100
 It was Kenya's first time to go to war or lead a military 
intervention against another state, so the intervention was a significant decision. Even 
though the Somali TFG stated that it did not invite Kenya to help in the war against the 
Shabaab, they decided to support the effort since it provided valuable military training 
and assistance to their own forces.
101
 Al-Shabaab encouraged its members to retaliate 
violently against Kenya for its involvement.  
The African Union has also become a secondary party in the conflict due to its 
involvement through AMISOM. As Ethiopian troops made substantial inroads in 
Mogadishu against the ICU and convinced some of its senior leaders to switch alliances 
to the TFG, AMISOM was established in 2007 and spent the next three years trying to 
gain control of the capital. Originally given a six month mandate, AMISOM was given 
new strength in 2009 and basically became Somalia's de facto army. Today, AMISOM 
is tasked with a broad mission of countering Al Shabaab and other opposition groups,; 
expanding the Federal Government's control over Somalia; supporting the government 
in establishing security, infrastructure, rule of law, and delivery of basic services; 
supporting the government in being able to hold free and fair elections by 2016; and 
facilitating humanitarian assistance in Somalia, including resettlement of IDPs, among 
other responsibilities.
102
 The size of the force is over 22,000 people.
103
 Since AMISOM 
includes Ethiopian and Kenyan troops, some of the federal government's political 
opponents have stated that "Kenya and Ethiopia, under the cover of AMISOM, have 
gained a free hand to support sectarian Somali clients to gerrymander the country's 
future" rather than bolster Somalia to support itself through democratic governance and 
a capable military.
104
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The United Nations has played an important role in the conflict since the 1990's, 
as outlined in the historical background. The UN's botched intervention attempts forever 
altered the political economy of the country by employing members of certain clans as 
local representatives at higher wages than most Somalis, and by leaving behind massive 
amounts of scrap metal and materials which a few individuals were able to sell and use 
to become wealthy war lords. 
105
 Therefore, the United Nations is actually a key player 
in the ongoing conflict and in fact, a source of conflict. In November 1992 UN 
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali outlined the options for continuing involvement in 
Somalia. Maintaining the status quo was not feasible since supplies intended for aid and 
relief were being hijacked by warring militias. Abandoning the mission entirely was 
also not seen as an option since,  
Apart from the fact that an admission of failure of this magnitude is too costly 
for a new Secretary- General in his first year in office, it was also unlikely to be 
acceptable to a United Nations flushed with success in dealing with Iraqi 
aggression. Moreover, coming on top of a policy of inaction in the former 
Yugoslavia, it would have called into question the credibility of the organization. 
106
 
Thus, the UN's primary motive for being involved in the conflict is revealed; in an effort 
to avoid having its credibility questioned and the UN's leadership to reveal weakness, 
the organization entangled itself in one of the messiest and most intractable conflicts in 
modern history. 
 
 
4.4.3 Interested third parties 
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 The United States has played a lesser role in the conflict primarily since joining 
the UN effort in the early 1990's and once again in 2006 when the US believed that 
Somalia was becoming a breeding ground for radical Islamic terrorists. As Bruton 
explained, the US is mainly interested in: preventing Somalia from becoming a safe 
haven for al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, preventing destabilization of the region 
and resulting large-scale humanitarian disasters, and protecting sea lanes from piracy.
107
 
CIA support of the TFG and Ethiopian intervention in 2006 was in part responsible for 
the swift public backlash to the TFG. A series of US strikes against militants in Somalia 
in 2008 threatened to undermine peace talks between the remnants of the ICU and TFG. 
108
 The U.S. has recently begun to conduct operations in Somalia again; news reports in 
early September 2014 indicate that the U.S. conducted a drone strike against Al-
Shabaab.
109
  Like the UN, the US has historically been a source of conflict in Somalia 
rather than a mediating presence.  
Turkey has become an important interested third party mainly since 2011. The 
details of Turkey's initial push in Somalia, including Erdoğan's seminal visit to 
Mogadishu, are described below. Now, it is time for a closer look at Turkey's 
motivations for involvement. Even though Turkey's intervention was framed in terms of 
humanitarianism and genuine concern, it also had strategic reasons for choosing to 
intervene in Somalia. International Crisis Group (ICG) is one of the few organizations 
that has provided a partial critique of Turkey's actions in Somalia. ICG states that even 
though Turkey's intervention originated in a humanitarian desire to help the country, its 
strategic reasons for doing so should not be overlooked. ICG goes on to identify 
domestic political considerations as a motivating factor for Turkey's intervention, since 
the AKP's benevolence toward a fellow Muslim country plays well with domestic 
audiences; and business considerations, due to the increasing trade opportunities that a 
stable (and grateful) Somalia can bring to Turkish entrepreneurs. Politically, Somalia 
provides Turkey a chance to exercise its soft power and show the world that Turkey has 
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an important role to play in the region. While Turkey may be forced to intervene in 
countries still at the messy peak of conflict such as Syria due to its proximity, Somalia 
was a strategic choice. In 2011 the Transitional Federal Government had UN backing, 
was on the path toward establishing legitimacy in Mogadishu, and was paving the way 
for a successful permanent government. The conditions were ripe for Turkey to do what 
it does best; humanitarian aid, economic development, and civilian capacity building. In 
fact, Ali (2011) identified Somalia as Turkey's "foundation for its foray into Africa" and 
a way for Turkey to "pronounce its unique foreign policy orientation, predicated upon 
its moral authority, not its military or economic clout."
110
  Murphy and Sazak (2012) 
called Somalia "the capstone of Turkish development aid, technical and civilian 
assistance in Africa."
111
 Therefore, Turkey's domestic political considerations and 
perception as a soft power internationally are tied to Somalia's outcome.  
Economically, Somalia provides an opportunity for Turkey to utilize its skilled 
(and growing) workforce, especially in the construction sector, since Somalia lacks 
skilled labor after so many decades of violence. Turkey has rebuilt Mogadishu's airport 
along with hospitals, schools, and other major infrastructure projects, often utilizing 
companies owned by the "Anatolian tigers;" emerging businessmen from central Turkey 
with ties to the Erdoğan government.112 For example, Favori LLC, a firm founded by 
Kardeşler Construction Group and Çetin Group from Turkey, will invest $10 million to 
enlarge the Mogadishu International Airport.
113
 Turkish medical company Medical Park 
opened a hospital in Mogadishu in March 2012 with the capacity to treat 600 people 
daily, costing $5 million.
114
  The economic benefits of Turkey's foray into Africa are 
already apparent; "Turkey's exports to Africa leapt to $10.3 billion last year from $2.1 
billion in 2003, with iron and steel, mineral fuels and machinery among the most 
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exported items, according to Turkey's Ministry of Economy."
115
 Business organizations 
such as the Turkish-Somali Businessmen Association (SOMTURBAS) and the Turkish-
Somali Development Forum have been established. Somalia is a key factor in 
expanding the horizons for ambitious Turkish firms and providing a gateway to the rest 
of Africa.  
 
 
4.5 Dynamics 
 
 
4.5.1 Precipitating events 
 
The precipitating events to the conflict between Al-Shabaab and the Somali 
Federal Government have already been discussed extensively in the Conflict history and 
Context sections. Now, we should turn our attention to the events that really jump 
started Turkey's involvement with Somalia. Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan along with his wife, daughter, and more than 200 political, business, and 
cultural elite arrived in Mogadishu in August 2011. 
116
 Rather than remaining in the 
heavily-fortified airport as countless lower-level foreign visitors had done since 1992, 
Erdoğan and his family ventured into the city and were heavily photographed holding 
Somali children and speaking with families devastated by the famine and years of war. 
In doing so, Erdoğan became the first foreign leader in two decades to enter the city. 117 
His visit made a huge impression on Somalis, evidenced by their adoration of Erdoğan 
and the Turks through Erdoğan's pictures and Turkish flags hung about the city, Turkish 
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music played on radio stations, and countless opinion pieces and other news articles 
which appeared in the Somali press around the same time. 
118
  Turkey's Foreign 
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stated at the time that the visit was largely symbolic, aimed 
at showing the international community that Mogadishu should no longer be avoided. 
119
 At the time, Mogadishu was controlled by the Transitional Federal Government 
along with 9,000 African Union (AMISOM) forces. 
 
 
4.5.2 Issue emergence, transformation, and proliferation 
 
The conflict in Somalia is complex; it is not based simply on a lack of resources 
but on divisions between clans, disparate ideologies, foreign interests and intervention, 
lack of leadership, and absence of stable institutions. Dr. Ayare Elmi, a Somali 
academic now working in Qatar, identified several causes of the conflict, including 
destructive competition over resources and power among the political class; a colonial 
legacy and 20 years of dictatorship; the presence of unemployed, idle youth; availability 
of weapons and expensive guns; and elements in the culture that legitimize the use of 
violence - what he called a culture of violence.
120
 Most actors have a zero-sum view of 
power; believing that if power is obtained by a rival clan or militia (often the same 
thing), they will be powerless. As Menkhaus explained, Somalis' adaptation to an 
environment without governance has perhaps become counterproductive, as incentives 
to stay with the status quo and prevent stable governance grow.
121
 The preference for a 
strong central government or decentralized state depends on the benefits that each will 
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accrue to a particular clan. While some weaker clans want a federal government, those 
that benefit from the chaos push to maintain it. Meanwhile Islamists reject the idea of a 
federal government completely. Spoilers have played a particularly large role in the 
conflict; as Menkhaus stated:  
Some spoilers have successfully undermined peace accords to perpetuate armed 
conflict; others have acted only to undercut local efforts to improve law and 
order and reduce criminality; still others support peacebuilding and the reduction 
of crime, but block efforts to revive an effective central government. 
The importance of spoilers in Somalia is due to the interest that many actors have in 
creating peace and rule-of-law locally while also preventing the formation of a 
functional state.  
 
 
4.5.3 Polarization 
 
As usual in Turkish politics, polarization has largely occurred between the two 
dominant parties, AKP and CHP. In February 2014, CHP deputy Osman Koruturk 
submitted a parliamentary question regarding the government's distribution of foreign 
aid. Regarding Somalia, he stated, "There are serious doubts about whether the financial 
aid has been received by Somalia, where accountability of the government is doubtful 
and where the financial transaction does not work due to the lack of banking and 
auditing mechanisms and where a corruption scandal took place in 2013."
122
 CHP 
Deputy Chairman Faruk Logoglu submitted a similar question the same month. These 
questions partially arise due to the fact that Somalia's lack of banking infrastructure 
meant that Turkish officials gave foreign aid "paid in boxes full of cash to the central 
bank" rather than through more transparent banking processes.
123
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4.5.4 Spiraling 
 
 Since Turkey's push for Somalia in 2011, the violence in the country has in some 
ways improved, and in others, digressed. In July 2013, Al-Shabaab attacked an office 
housing Turkish Embassy staff in Mogadishu, killing three people including one Turk. 
The explanation for the attack by Turkish officials was interesting, with Prime Minister 
Erdoğan claiming that the attack was carried out "against the Turkish government. 
Why? Because we are helping our brothers in Mogadishu."
124
 An Istanbul-based 
academic claimed that the attack was aimed at disrupting Turkey's aid efforts, while 
another academician stated that Western countries were in fact inciting violence because 
they are not happy with Turkey's encroachment on their power in the region.
125
 A new 
tactic of targeting Somali political institutions has emerged, as Al-Shabaab attempts to 
strike at the heart of Somalia's future prospects for stability. Members of Parliament 
have been a special target, with five Parliamentary representatives being killed so far in 
2014.
126
 In July, Al-Shabaab attacked both the Presidential Palace and Parliament 
building.
127
 
 The humanitarian situation in Somalia also seemed to improve after 2011, when 
Turkey stepped in to assist Somalis in the face of a terrible famine. However, in 
Summer 2014 Somalia was again threatened with famine, as reports indicated that 
"around 203,000 children under the age of five are acutely malnourished while about 
2.9 million people need urgent life-saving support" as of August 2014.
128
 The UN calls 
the current situation in Somalia one of "food insecurity and malnutrition" due to the 
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ongoing conflict, lower than average rains, increasing food prices, and the inability of 
aid agencies to deliver assistance in certain parts of the country due to violence.  
 Finally, the political situation in Somalia has been through ups and downs over 
the past three years. The Federal Government of Somalia has attempted to establish 
control over more of the country in order to realize its goal of holding elections by 
2016, yet some observers are concerned about the possibility of political fragmentation. 
Quarrels at the sub-national level caused by regional tensions and clan-based alliances 
threaten to derail the federalism process. The UN's envoy to Somalia expressed his fears 
for the country, stating, "I fear that Somalia is approaching a danger zone in a number 
of areas. Politically, there needs to be urgent progress in establishing the mechanisms to 
revise and implement the constitution, oversee the establishment of federal states and 
prepare for elections."
129
 Somalia's state-building exercise is not moving as swiftly as 
expected, and opposition to the President threatens to throw the country back into 
deadlock.  The Somali Compact was completed after consultation with a wide variety of 
stakeholders in September 2013. It outlines a "strategic framework for coordinating 
political, security and development efforts for peace and statebuilding activities" from 
2014-2016.
130
 If the Somali government can maintain momentum in its efforts to 
implement the Compact, the spiraling violence and precarious humanitarian situation 
will be remedied.  
 
 
4.5.5 Stereotyping and mirror imaging 
 
 Al-Shabaab has criticized Turkey's involvement in Somalia, claiming that 
Turkey wants to import secularism to the country. They believe that Turkey is working 
for Western countries as a secular spy; that Turkey's aim is to make Somalia a secular 
country. They are especially critical of people who receive scholarships to study in 
Turkey. One of the Al-Shabaab leaders said regarding the 400 students who go to 
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Turkey with a Diyanet scholarship that "Turkey is feeding their neo-colonial ambitions" 
with the scholarships. A Shabab Imam claimed that students are being educated in 
Turkey to become spies and receive a military education. There is also a rumor that 
Somali girls who study in Turkey cannot wear hijab. These rumors and criticisms are 
dangerous in a society where most people have limited access to main stream sources of 
news. 
At the same time, it is difficult to hear Somalis themselves say anything negative 
about Turkey. Since service delivery is a key area of concern in the Somali 
government's development policy, Turkish efforts in this area are noticeable and benefit 
a wide segment of society. As one Somali pharmacist stated, "Other governments say 
they will come but they are not serious. The Turkish government said it would come 
and it started operating immediately."
131
 When asked how fair he considered the 
International Crisis Group's criticisms of Turkey's interventions in Somalia to be 
(specifically the criticism that Turkey does not put conditions on the Somali 
government for the receipt of its aid), Somali academic Dr. Afyare Abdi Elmi replied 
(paraphrased), "I've seen some of the projects and practically, the infrastructure of 
Turkish efforts is unparalleled. Turkey has done a great thing. What should Turkey 
learn? It should expand to the rest of the country and future interventions". Clearly, he 
is so impressed with Turkish efforts in Somalia that he is encouraging Turkey to 
broaden the scope of its activities throughout the country and possibly, in other post-
conflict zones.  
Certainly, the former TFG praised Turkey's role in Somalia. Somalia's former 
Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali said Turkey had "changed the landscape in 
Somalia." "They are the sponsor we have been looking for the last 20 years. They are 
the Holy Grail for Somalia," said Ali. 
132
 Judging by Turkey's presence as a facilitator 
between Somalia and Somaliland in 2013, the relationship between Turkey and the 
Federal Government of Somalia seems to be off to a good start. Recently, Somalia's 
president thanked Turkey for its support, saying "Turkey has shown remarkable support 
to Somalia during a time where the world seemed to have forgotten about us. The 
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friendship and support Turkey has shown is something that will be forever 
cherished."
133
 
 
 
4.6 Conflict regulation potential 
 
 
4.6.1 Internal limiting factors 
 
 Perhaps the most significant internal limiting factor is the Somali people's desire 
for stability and an end to the violence. In a hopeful January 2013 article, Somali 
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy Catherine Ashton wrote, 
A successful military campaign has succeeded in asphyxiating Al Shabaab 
while, daily, defectors seek to give up violence and find a future in this new 
Somalia. Piracy in 2012 was 95% down on 2011. Somalis are returning from 
exile, investing and helping build a new state. Mogadishu, the capital, is 
bustling. The aroma of coffee has replaced the whiff of cordite. Militias, once 
the instruments of warlords, are now negotiating their integration into a national 
army. Regions that had to survive on their own through twenty years of civil war 
are now engaged in a debate over how they will become part of a federal 
system.
134
 
Over one and a half years later, this assessment still rings true; however, the Somali 
Federal Government must take steps to hasten the transition to a truly federal nation and 
consolidate control over wider territory if it hopes to sustain the momentum. If the SFG 
can bring together the nation, create a truly federal nation, extend the rule of law over a 
wider stretch of Somali territory, and most importantly, ensure transparency in the 
governing institutions, then it will prove to be the best internal limiting factor in the 
conflict. If the Somali National Army is able to take over from AMISOM and truly 
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serve as Somalia's defense force, it will be another significant internal limiting factor. 
However, AMISOM is still the primary defense for Somalia against Al-Shabaab as the 
SNA is still not able to operate to the level required to serve as the primary military 
force. Somalia's private sector could also serve as a long-term stabilizing force by 
creating the economic conditions conducive to peace. Somalia has many natural 
resources, including coal, gas, and minerals; the longest coastline in Africa; a strong 
agricultural sector; and the ability to raise livestock.
135
 An interesting internal and 
external limiting factor is the Somali diaspora. The Somali Federal Government is 
currently trying to encourage young professionals and businesspeople to return and 
invest in the country, especially those with knowledge of the ICT and 
telecommunications sectors.
136
 Remittances from the diaspora already constitute a form 
of aid to the Somali people, but the SFG hopes that as the diaspora returns, the 
remittances will turn into investment in the country.  
 
 
4.6.2 External limiting factors 
 
AMISOM has thus far been the largest external limiting factor in the conflict by 
acting as the de facto Somali military, routing Al-Shabaab from the capital and slowly 
from other parts of the country, providing protection to humanitarian workers, and 
doing a variety of other tasks to improve the country's safety and stability. Their 
mandate was extended in 2013 by the UN Security Council until 2016, at which time 
they plan on leaving Somalia.
137
 The United States military has also sent a limited 
number of advisors to Somalia to support the Somali National Army and AMISOM. 
There are currently around 120 troops in Somalia, and the US military has secretly 
maintained some troops in the country since 2007.
138
 The troops' main goal is to train 
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and advise the Somali National Army, rather than conducting combat missions 
themselves.  
 
 
4.6.3 Interested or neutral third parties 
 
Turkey's involvement in Somalia has obviously produced many benefits for 
Somalis; scholarships given to Somali students to study in Turkey, opening up 
Mogadishu to the world, assistance in infrastructure development, humanitarian aid, and 
other tangible benefits. However, Turkey is not without criticism, mainly articulated by 
the International Crisis Group, which produced the most comprehensive report on 
Turkish involvement in Somalia to date. In their report (2012), ICG criticizes Turkey 
for not having a realistic and sustainable Somalia policy (and not enough 
knowledgeable diplomats to implement it); not tying development aid to good 
governance and financial stability, and thus de-incentivizing the Somali government 
from improving its processes; not coordinating with the international community 
effectively when delivering aid and security assistance; and for not expanding its 
assistance outside Mogadishu rapidly enough, which might cause resentment and 
further exacerbate inequality throughout the country; among other criticisms and 
recommendations.
139
  
Though not specifically discussing Turkey, Menkhaus (2006-2007) identified 
the negative effects of foreign aid on Somalia's political economy; foreign aid 
artificially inflated the country's budget and lead to a political system based on 
patronage which was unsustainable when Somalia was left to operate on its true 
budget.
140
 Foreign aid also reduces the need for comprise and consensus-building, 
enabling the government to act autonomously when it should seek compromise. These 
problems are similar to the ones pointed out by ICG when they report that Turkey's 
habit of providing aid through the Somali government without incentivizing the 
government to achieve important development milestones actually enables it to continue 
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operating poorly, and in some cases, corruptly. The economy is one of the worst in the 
world and relies on foreign remittances, nomadic pastoralism, and has almost no public 
sector involvement. Due to the long absence of a central government, the economy is 
largely unregulated and criminality remains rampant. ICG points out that Turkey 
funnels most of its aid through the President's office, often ignoring the Prime Minister 
and completely bypassing other ministries  The combination of foreign aid artificially 
inflating Somalia's capabilities and being funneled primarily through the President 
creates a situation ripe for corruption. 
 
 
4.6.4 Techniques of conflict management 
 
Turkey understood from the beginning that traditional forms of mediation would 
not work in Somalia's complex environment.  Somalia requires a fresh approach, which 
Turkey's Ambassador to Somalia terms "modified mediation," and involves deploying 
aid rather than diplomats, and encouraging the parties "without fear or favor." Ufuk 
Gezer also calls it "modifying mediation", saying "you try to modify the situation on the 
ground with a view toward creating a more amendable situation for the resolution." 
Turkey's first task was to end the famine, but its second task was to end Somalia's 
isolation in the international community. In order to accomplish those goals, Turkey 
spent time to understand the issues that ailed Somalia; spent more time attempting to 
establish its credentials as a benefactor, and worked to gain the trust of the Somali 
people and government. As Ufuk Gezer stated: 
You see Turkey going in with a long-term commitment seeing mediation as part 
of a larger peace building agenda. State building is not part of it. We're not 
making the mistakes of the past 20 years. When you look around, the 
international community went in with immense capacity and resources, but when 
you get bogged down in the state building exercise, there are little precious 
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success stories that we can talk about. This is the lesson we're getting from these 
experiences.
141
 
In addition to the Turkish government and business community, Turkish NGOs 
are also active in Somalia. As previously mentioned, Somalia actually received the 
highest amount of financial assistance by Turkish NGOs in 2012 with $26.41 million, 
followed by Syria with $19.97 million. Murphy and Sazak (2012) identified several 
NGOs that were operating in Somalia which were either Turkish or with Turkish 
support, including Doctors Worldwide, Kimse Yok Mu (Is Anybody There?), 
Humanitarian Aid Foundation (IHH), Islamic Relief, Physicians for Hope Foundation, 
and the Gulen-affiliated Nile Foundation of Turkey.
142
 International Crisis Group also 
identified Helping Hands as a smaller non-profit operation in Somalia.
143
 In 2012, for 
instance, IHH conducted cataract surgeries for 200 in Somalia, constructed a school, 
drilled a water well, and distributed food aid.
144
 Kimse Yok Mu constructed a hospital 
in Mogadishu, constructed dormitory buildings and soup kitchens, drilled water wells, 
and provided scholarships for Somali students to study in Turkey.
145
 
The Turkish government coordinates aid in Somalia through the Turkish 
International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), which is basically the go-
between for distributing aid and determining projects between the Turkish and Somali 
ministries, agencies, and government officials. TIKA has also coordinated some 
projects itself. In 2012, TIKA coordinated the delivery of 50 tons of material and 80 
tons of medicine, provided two inflatable field hospitals and their equipment, delivered 
healthcare services through ambulances and other vehicles, trained healthcare providers, 
delivered food packages to hungry families, constructed structures such as a water 
treatment plant and children's playgrounds, selected 400 Somali students to study in 
Turkey through interviews, established an Animal Waste and Bone Disposal Facility 
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with a daily capacity of 1 ton, and cleared the wreckage of planes from Mogadishu to 
"remove psychological effects of the war."
146
   
Turkey's Health Ministry and Religious Affairs Directorate (DIYANET) also 
played active roles in administering humanitarian assistance. For example, DIYAT 
conducted the repair and maintenance of the Sheikh Sufi School building, provided 
scholarships to Somali students to study in Turkey, and gave sacrificial meat to Somali 
families during Ramadan.
147
 Some projects demonstrate the power of various Turkish 
government agencies, NGOs, and the private sector working in unison. The only two 
hospitals currently in operation in Somalia were built by Turkey; Shifa built by Medical 
Park and the field hospital built by the Turkish Ministry of Health. Doctors Worldwide 
Turkey continues to train Somali staff for the hospital and periodically sends envoys of 
doctors there to perform surgeries.  
After establishing its presence in Mogadishu and gaining the trust of the Somali 
people and administration, Turkey has turned its attention in 2013 to more traditional 
forms of mediation, acting as the mediator for talks between Somalia and Somaliland. 
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
and President Abdullah Gul met with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud and 
Somaliland President Ahmed Silanyo in Ankara in April 2013 to discuss cooperation 
between the two administrations. 
148
 Even though the two sides apparently could not 
reach an agreement about the largest looming issue, whether Somaliland would 
eventually unify as part of Somalia, the President of Somaliland had nothing but praise 
for Turkey's involvement, saying: “Turkey has played a very important role in trying to 
bring different sides together during the Somali conflict. They have consistently put an 
effort into establishing stability and promoting development in the region.” 149 Both 
parties consistently praise Turkey's involvement in the process, and Turkey continues to 
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participate in international conferences on Somalia such as the Somalia Conference held 
in London in May 2013.  
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
 
 When we compare what has been discussed about Turkey's involvement in 
Somalia with the definitions of humanitarian intervention described in the literature 
review, it is clear that Turkey's efforts in Somalia cannot be described as humanitarian 
intervention. Turkey has the permission of the Somali Federal Government (and of the 
Transitional Federal Government before that) and is not using force. However, Turkey's 
efforts can be described as "interference," since Turkey is intervening in a conflict to 
help the victims and support one side over the other. Turkey has been criticized by some 
observers, especially the International Crisis Group, for acting somewhat unilaterally in 
its relationship with Somalia; for example, by not coordinating aid to the Somali 
security forces with AMISOM and for Turkey's criticism of other international actors 
and countries which have been more deeply involved in the conflict for longer than 
Turkey. However, Turkey has certainly coordinated with the international community to 
open up Somalia to the world; it has encouraged more countries to move embassies to 
Mogadishu and for NGOs to do the same with their representative offices, it has hosted 
conferences on Somalia attended by all the relevant international actors and attended the 
same abroad, and it has become part of the regional working groups related to the 
conflict. Ultimately, Turkey's efforts regarding Somalia can be labelled as more 
inclusive than not, and these efforts have been highly praised by a wide swath of Somali 
stakeholders, from government officials to academics to ordinary citizens.  
 After establishing a close relationship with the Somali Federal Government; 
economic ties through trade, investment, and construction; and becoming ingrained as a 
benefactor of the Somali people through aid such as educational scholarships, medical 
care, and food distribution, Turkey was fully invested in Somalia's future and seen as a 
beneficial player by nearly every group of stakeholders. Then, Turkey was able to 
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extend its influence by mediating between the Somali Federal Government and 
Somaliland. Though there is not much specific information available about Turkey's 
actions in this mediation, it is clear that Turkey is an insider mediator due to its 
relationship with the Somali Federal Government. The mediation is not a one-off event, 
but the latest effort in Turkey's ongoing relationship with Somalia. Turkey certainly has 
ties to Somalia and is invested in the outcome of the conflict. In other words, this 
instance of mediation fits nicely within the four points that Ufuk Gezer outlined about 
what makes Turkey an effective mediator. Since Turkey and the rest of the international 
community desires to see Somalia and Somaliland united, it is hard to understand how 
Turkey can be a neutral, objective mediator; two criteria that Ahmet Davutoğlu 
identified as being important for good mediators. However, Turkey has not done 
anything to harm its relationship with Somaliland, and has, by all indications, 
approached the mediation with a desire to assist both parties in accomplishing what is 
best for the Somali people. Overall, Turkey's involvement in Somalia is a good example 
of how Turkey can incorporate mediation into a broader strategy of involvement in 
conflict situations, including development aid, support to the government without 
attempting to directly influence its decision-making process, creating economic ties, and 
helping to open up the country to the international community.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SYRIA 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
 Just as Somalia is Turkey's centerpiece in its increasing relationship with Africa, 
Syria was Turkey's gateway to the Middle East. Since 2009, Turkey has been working 
to build a stronger relationship with Syria, and to use this relationship to broaden 
cultural, economic, and political ties with other Middle Eastern countries. The following 
sections provide a comprehensive overview of Turkey's involvement in the Syrian 
conflict, which has thus far not been described in significant detail by the academic 
literature. After understanding the conflict and Turkey's involvement, we will be able to 
discuss which aspects of Turkey's involvement have so far produced results that have 
been beneficial to the Syrians Turkey has sought to aid, and to Turkey itself; and which 
aspects have thus far led to consequences that were perhaps unintended or 
unanticipated. At the same time, we must avoid heavy-handed pronouncements of 
'success' and 'failure' since the conflict is ongoing and determining what constitutes a 
successful or unsuccessful intervention effort is a very subjective task that is outside the 
purview of this thesis. That being said, we can still draw conclusions about how Turkey 
is best positioned to utilize its soft power, humanitarian capacity, and mediation 
capabilities; and what other similarly-positioned states can learn from it.  
 
 
 
56 
 
5.2 Conflict history 
 
 
Knowledge of Syria's fraught history is key to understanding the environment of 
repression, skepticism, and secrecy that eventually led not only to protests, but the 
Assad government's violent response to them. Most accounts of Syria's position in the 
Middle East begin with the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, which was certainly a defining 
moment in Syria's and the region's history. However, it was the French mandate which 
began after WWI in 1923 and ended in 1943 with the creation of the separate states of 
Syria and Lebanon, which impacts today's conflict. When the Ottoman Empire was 
dissolved after WWI, the Sykes-Picot Agreement assigned the territory in what is today 
Syria, Lebanon, and Hatay (now part of Turkey) to the French. Part of Syria's instability 
has always been attributed to its diverse population. 60% is Sunni Arab Muslim, 13% 
Christian, 12% Alawite, 9% Kurdish, and 5% Druz. 
150
 In order to govern their new 
territory, the French installed Alawites, a minority group in the midst of a majority 
Sunni territory, into positions of power and divided the territory into six autonomous 
regions, further exacerbating religious and sectarian differences. During French rule 
Syrians were temporarily united against the French, and sectarian interests were not 
divisive. After independence,  
Aleppines contested with Damascenes for dominance in commercial and 
political life; the Druzes pledged allegiance to Druzes, the Kurds to Kurds, and 
tribal peoples to tribal institutions. Alawis, the poorest yet largest of the 
minorities, tried to rebel from Sunni Muslim control. Rural leaders contended 
with urban leaders; the progressive, increasingly secularized, younger generation 
vied with the older, religious-minded leaders. 
151
 
The first Syrian President, Quwatly, was immediately faced with the crisis of the 
creation of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent Arab invasion. The first of Syria's 
numerous military coups occurred in March 1949, followed by a counter coup in 
August of the same year. In November 1951 the country's third coup was orchestrated 
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by Colonel Adib Shishakli, who established the Arab Liberation Movement (ALM) and 
abolished all other political parties. In a July 1953 referendum Syria became a 
presidential republic with one-party rule. However Shishakli's regime would not last; 
the army staged a fourth coup in February 1954 and re-installed the 1949 government. 
Throughout the early 1950's the Syrian government was marked by power shifts 
between conservatives and left-wing socialists. By 1955 however the Baath Party and 
Syrian Communist Party were the most organized and the only parties not beholden to 
sectarian interests. The British, French, and Israeli invasion of Sinai in 1956 solidified 
the anti-Western sentiment that was already present in Syria, and the country began to 
cooperate more with the Soviet Union while becoming increasingly isolated in the 
Middle East. By 1957 the Baathists, Communists, and other left-wing allies were 
completely in control of the government and a fierce power struggle between the two 
major parties ensued. 
152
 
In an attempt to prevent the Communists from seizing control of the 
government, the Baath party announced a union with Egypt in 1957 as part of Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdul Nasser's plan for a united Arab nation. The United Arab 
Republic was thus formed, but the Baath party miscalculated its results. Instead of the 
Baath party receiving a favored place of power, the Nasser regime gained complete 
control of both Syria and Egypt. Syrians also became dissatisfied with Nasser's rule, as 
a drought hit Syria and Egyptians began to assume all the key Syrian administrative 
posts. In September 1961 yet another military coup was staged in Damascus, and Syria 
was free from the UAR. 
153
  
From 1961-1966 Syria experienced a series of coups, counter-coups, dissolved 
governments, and power struggles that left the government in complete chaos, including 
the first coup to cause violence in the capital in July 1963. Finally in February 1966 two 
Baathist, Alawi generals, Salah al Jadid and Hafiz al Assad launched a coup that placed 
an extremist wing of the Baath Party in power. This extremist wing was opposed to 
Arab union and instead favored an independent Syria, more closely aligned with the 
Soviet Union than with other Arab governments. Major General Assad was appointed 
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Minister of Defense, making him intimately involved in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war that 
would have immediate and lasting impacts on the region. 
154
  
As  Lesch (2005) explained, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war was a radical turning 
point for the Middle East, resulting in several repercussions that would permanently 
impact Assad and Syria, including: a) the creation of the occupied territories, including 
Israel's capture of the Golan Heights from Syria b) the end of secular Arab nationalism 
with the defeat of Nasser c) the resurrection of Islamism, particularly anti-Western and 
anti-Israeli, due to the realization that secular Arab regimes were unable to confront 
Israel or mend the region's broken economies and d) increasing involvement of the 
United States and Soviet Union in the region. The 1967 war was quickly followed by 
the "War of Attrition" in March 1969 - August 1970 which, though led by Egypt and 
with very little involvement from Syria, would eventually lead to Hafiz al-Assad's 
assumption of power. 
155
 
From 1968-1970 the military wing of the Baath party, led by Assad, and the 
political wing led by Jadid, vied for power. Their differences regarding Palestinians 
were particularly stark; Jadid wanted to support the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
completely, including in its short-lived war against Jordan's King Hussein, while Assad 
wanted to refrain from outright support. Despite the Baath party's Congress on 
November 12, 1970 which reaffirmed Jadid's civilian rule and censored Assad for his 
military's meddling in politics, Assad staged an internal, bloodless coup on November 
13th which deposed Jadid and installed Assad as Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defense along with his hand-selected government. By March 1971 Assad was elected 
president of the Syrian Arab Republic. Assad's regime was actually more pragmatic 
than that of Jadid; he opened up the economy to the private sector and pursued better 
relations with other Arab states, but remained committed to the return of the Golan 
Heights. 
156
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The 1973 Arab-Israeli war launched by Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in an 
attempt to reclaim the Sinai Peninsula once again had an immense impact on Syria and 
the region. Syria was encouraged to enter the war by Egypt, and in fact Assad's goal 
was to reclaim the Golan Heights. Initially the Arabs inflicted heavy losses on Israel, 
but the tide turned and while Sadat attempted to negotiate a cease-fire with Israel and 
the U.S., the Israelis advanced almost to Damascus and killed around 6,000 Syrians. 
Bashar al-Assad was eight at the time and his early memories of evacuating Damascus 
and the grief surrounding Syrian losses would have a large impact on his early 
impressions of political power. After the war, Syria was more isolated than ever in the 
Arab world, and looked toward the Soviet Union for weapons as a bulwark against 
further Israeli aggression. 
157
  
The next significant development for the Assad regime occurred in the 1980s 
when the Muslim Brethren (MB) began to emerge in Syria due to several reasons: a) the 
secular nature of the Baath regime b) economic difficulties combined with rampant 
corruption c) the example set by the Iranian revolution and d) Assad's support for 
Maronite Christians in Lebanon against the PLO. 
158
 In February 1982 Assad ordered 
the now infamous attack against the Muslim Brethren stronghold, Hama. The attack left 
between 10,000 - 30,000 Syrians dead and crushed the MB opposition in the country, 
but the Assad regime's reputation suffered both domestically and internationally as a 
result. 
159
 In a conversation with Dr. Lesch, Bashar Assad explained his father's regime's 
attitude toward the Muslim Brothers, comments that shed light on his reaction to today's 
protests:  
Syria has a great deal of experience with the Muslim Brothers…my father 
negotiated with them to possibly become part of the government. They did not 
say no, but they said they wanted to discuss it. But they kept on killing while 
they were thinking about it. In the end they did not want to share power - they 
wanted to take power, and they wanted to transform Syria into an Islamic 
republic…So we began the conflict with them in 1979…It was a difficult time, 
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much worse than when Nasser was confronted by Muslim Brothers, because my 
father was not as strong as Nasser was at the time, and we were besieged and 
somewhat isolated in the region. 
160
      
Bashar is articulating the Assad regime's fear of what they perceive to be radical 
Islamist groups wishing to overthrow their government and impose Islamic law upon 
the country, something that the staunchly secular Baath party has worked hard to 
prevent. Therefore, Bashar's rhetoric today identifying the protesters as extremists and 
accusing them of imposing Sharia law on parts of the country is no surprise. Though, at 
least initially, the Assad regime undoubtedly claimed that the opposition was composed 
of extremists for their own political maneuvering, those accusations might be based in 
part on Assad's personal experiences and natural fear of extremists taking root in Syria.  
 Another event during Hafiz Assad's presidency that probably had an impact on 
Bashar's conception of state power occurred in 1983, when Hafiz became ill and his 
brother Rifaat, commander of the Defense Companies (an elite unit of the Syrian 
military) made a move to usurp power. Though Hafiz was able to force his brother to 
back down and maintained control, the fact that the Baath party, government structure, 
and military were unable to prevent Rifaat from a power grab during the president's 
illness taught the Assad’s a valuable lesson. In a prescient analysis, Lesch (2005) stated 
that Bashar realized that "the state had to build up a firmer institutional foundation so 
that it could better withstand such internal and external disruptions - this was fantasy 
back then [during Hafiz's reign]; Bashar was slowly attempting to turn fantasy into 
reality."
 161
 Many people expected the Syrian government to collapse quickly after the 
violence began, with talks of defections and possible internal power grabs occurring 
regularly in the Western media. It seemed that Bashar took this lesson from his father's 
experience and applied it to his own regime quite well, which helped to explain his 
regime's longevity in the face of serious internal dissent and ultimately, civil war.  
 Most people know that Bashar was never meant to be president. His elder 
brother Basil was groomed for the presidency but lost his life in a car accident in 1994. 
After Basil's death, Bashar returned from London where he was studying 
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ophthalmology to be with his family; a time during which many observers consider him 
to have been groomed for the presidency in the absence of his older brother, but which 
Bashar maintains he did to help his family without the clear objective of becoming 
president in mind. 
162
 In the period after Hafez Assad's death in 2000, people believed 
that Bashar would institute reforms. After all, he was an eye doctor who had been 
educated in England and had a beautiful, modern wife and family. After a short-lived 
"Damascus Spring" those hopes died. Political instability, the history of attempted 
coups, and Bashar's own life experiences growing up under his father's regime led him 
to focus on stability more than progress. The regime he inherited is described by critics 
such as Dr. Barry Rubin as: 
Syrians can conduct business only by making government officials their partners 
or succeed in most careers only by echoing the regime's ideology, whether they 
believe it in their hearts or not. It is a society where all the media are under 
regime control and adhere to the official line; sustained public criticism can lead 
to torture and imprisonment; cell phones and internet use are tightly controlled; 
private conversations may well be reported to the secret police; and any contact 
with a foreigner is suspect. Yet it is also a society in which the people generally 
accept the regime's stories and the permanent war footing this worldview 
demands.
163
  
The regime was co-opted by the elites and became known for patronage at a time when 
the country's wealth was more unevenly divided than ever. Lesch articulated the 
common regime sentiment that "there is almost too much societal inertia economically, 
culturally, and politically to bring about change in anything but an incremental 
fashion."
164
  However, change did not come fast enough even for Syria. 
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5.3 Conflict context 
 
 
Turkey intervened in Syria long before a conflict erupted. As Dr. Bülent Aras, 
one of the top academic advisors to Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu 
explained about Turkey's early engagement: 
‘The Turkish policy towards Syria is aimed at indirect transformation of Syria. 
There was an authoritarian rule and no way to get in touch directly with civil 
society and Syrian people. The only way was to help Syria through the regime. 
Trade liberalization, lifting visas; the idea was to facilitate exchange of people 
and goods and services. The other idea is to have an impact on the Syrian regime 
for some opening encounter. This is what I call "particular idealism;" it's not a 
universalistic idealism since you are engaging with an authoritarian regime, but 
it was the only way. 
165
 
The idea of "particular idealism" is an interesting one because it acknowledges that 
Turkey recognized the Assad regime as a less-than-ideal partner in the Middle East long 
before the protests began. Dr. Aras described a three-step policy which Turkey had 
toward Syria beginning in 2008. The first step was confidence building. Turkey and 
Syria went from being on the eve of war in the mid-2000s to having a good relationship 
by 2008 due to confidence building measures. The second step was engagement. Trade 
liberalization, lifting visas, high-level visits, and political dialogue between Turkish and 
Syrian ministers and the presidents were the key elements of this step. There was even 
talk as late as March 2011 about developing a 'Şamgen' visa system for Turkey, Syria, 
Iraq, and Iran; in contrast to the 'Schengen' visa regime used by the European Union.
166
 
The third step was integrating Syria into the international community. Unfortunately, 
Dr. Aras said that Turkish efforts stopped during the second stage when Syria began to 
experience protests and initial violence. 
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5.4 Conflict parties 
 
 
5.4.1 Primary Parties 
 
 Ulutas (2011) divided the initial protesters into two groups; the first group was 
made up of those who wanted the regime to "implement reforms that would address the 
immediate political and economic needs of the people" such as "the introduction of a 
multi-party system, abolition of the emergency law, amendment of local administration 
law, regulation of state security and intelligence services, judicial reform, etc." 
167
 The 
second group of protesters called for the fall of the regime. As the protests continued, 
those in the second group began to outnumber the ones in the first. 
168
 The opposition is 
now divided into political and military units, which are further sub-divided to the point 
of having multiple leaders and no central command structure. One of the international 
community's priorities has been to unite the opposition into groups which can be 
represented internationally and supported coherently.  
The Syrian National Coalition is the main body recognized by the international 
community and charged with leading the opposition efforts from outside Syria. The 
Coalition is supported by the Syrian National Council. The National Coalition named 
Ghassan Hitto as prime minister of an interim government which was tasked with 
providing stability and leadership to opposition-controlled areas in Syria. However, 
Hitto resigned on July 8, 2013 after claiming that he was unable to form an 
administration, in part due to mistrust within the National Coalition due to his 
perception of being aligned with Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood.
169
 Hitto was 
replaced by Ahmad Jarba, who served the maximum term of one year before being 
replaced by Hadi al-Bahra, the Coalition's chief negotiator in Geneva, in a  July 2014 
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vote held in Istanbul.
170
 The opposition has been plagued by infighting; accusations that 
it does not represent all of Syria's many religious, ethnic, and other minorities; and 
difficulties in securing international support.  
The Muslim Brotherhood has historically been the most active opposition to the 
Assad regime in Syria, despite being banned and severely persecuted. When the protests 
began the Brotherhood tried to avoid active participation in order to prevent the regime 
from labeling the protesters as extremists. 
171
 However, due to the disorganized nature 
of the protests and lack of unified opposition, the Brotherhood felt that they had to take 
a larger role in the opposition.
 172
 Now, Brotherhood members make up a significant 
portion of the political opposition and fighters, including a quarter of the Syrian 
National Council, which they helped found.
173
 The MB operating in Syria has 
historically had a good relationship with the AKP, with the AKP attempting to mediate 
between the MB and Assad regime in 2009 (an effort which ultimately failed to gain the 
MB entry back into Syria), hosting regular meetings in Turkey, and calling on Turkey to 
intervene in the Syrian conflict early in the fall of 2011.
174
        
The military opposition consists of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and brigades 
united under it; and jihadi opposition groups who are not affiliated with the FSA, and in 
fact, increasingly fight against it. The FSA is in reality multiple brigades fighting in 
different regions of Syria, with different command structures, yet all in opposition to the 
regime. These brigades are made up of mostly Sunni civilians, military defectors, and 
Islamists. The FSA is headed by the Supreme Military Council, based in Turkey, and 
led by Brigadier General Abdel Ilah al-Bashir, a Syrian army defector.
175
 Some of the 
largest brigades under the FSA include the Farouk Brigade (moderately Islamic; has 
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clashed with Jabhat al-Nusra), the Tawhid Brigade (conservative Islamist orientation), 
the Idlib Martyr's Brigade (involved in battles near the Turkish border), the National 
Unity Brigades (secular orientation and include many minority fighters), and the Salah 
al-Din al-Ayyubi Brigade (mostly Kurdish fighters).
176
 The FSA was once considered 
the strongest opposition group in Syria, but its influence and power has waned in light 
of the proliferation of extremist groups.  
Starting in mid-2012, extremist jihadi groups began operating in Syria, the first 
of which was the al Nusra Front (sometimes called Jabhat al Nusra). By March 2013 al 
Nusra established a religious council to administer Eastern Syria (Deir Al Zor, Hassaka 
and Al Raqqa provinces), which was largely under their control.
177
 By May 2013 al 
Nusra was in control of key oilfields near Raqqa which enabled them to profit from 
selling the crude oil; at first locally, and now even past the Turkish border.
178
 Free 
Syrian Army and other 'moderate' opposition fighters have begun defecting to extremist 
groups due to their greater ability to pay and provide benefits.
179
 The entry of the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), an al-Qaeda extension, in the conflict around 
early 2013 further splintered the opposition. ISIS' goal is not only to wrest control of 
Syria from Assad, but to establish an Islamic caliphate in Syria and eventually, the rest 
of the Middle East and world. Moderate opposition groups accused ISIS of imprisoning 
and executing opposition fighters, and possibly being in collusion with the Assad 
regime.
180
 The presence of Chechen members of ISIS who had previously served in the 
Russian military fueled these suspicions. A common belief is that Assad is allowing 
ISIS to proliferate in order to accuse the opposition of being radical Islamists, and hold 
himself up as the only moderate option for Syria's future. Even the Islamist groups 
                                                          
176
 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2013). Syria's armed opposition: a 
brief overview.  
177
 Gulf News. (2013). Syrian Islamist rebels set up Eastern council.  
178
 Spencer, Richard. (2013). Al-Qaeda's Syrian wing takes over the oilfields once 
belonging to Assad.  
179
 Sly, L. (2014). New U.S. help arrives for Syrian rebels as government, extremists 
gain. The Washington Post. 
180
 Sengupta, K. (2014). Syria's three way war: Free Syrian Army rebels fight the 
regime and, now, the Islamists. The Independent.   
66 
 
themselves are splintered and in opposition to one another; the Islamic Front has stated 
its opposition to ISIS while Jabhat al-Nusra has declared itself to be 'neutral'.
181
 Some of 
the other jihadi groups operating in Syria include Ahrar al Sham Brigade, Ahfad al 
Rasoul Brigades, Liwa al-Islam, and Al Farouk Brigades.
182
  
As discussed in the historical background section, the Assad regime is composed 
primarily of Alawites who also make up most of the Baath party apparatus, security 
forces, and other government officials. The main centers of power for the regime are 
"the president, ruling family and their personal networks; elite military units; and the 
security apparatus’s most aggressive components," which all depend on one another's 
survival in order to maintain the conflict. 
183
 Once again International Crisis Group has 
perhaps the best insight into the regime's logic thanks to their interviews with regime 
officials, who: 
 consistently portray the war as one of protracted attrition. On good days, they 
exude optimism they ultimately will prevail, albeit at huge cost to regime and 
country. On bad ones, they appear to accept possible defeat, but at a cost that 
would make their domestic and foreign enemies’ victory pyrrhic. In both 
instances, they cannot imagine a way for the regime to change its approach. 
184
 
In other words, the regime has convinced itself and its supporters that its only option in 
the conflict is to respond to the opposition with violence. Many observers thought that 
the Assad regime would fall quickly once numerous defections began from the Syrian 
army, including high-level officers. However, the defectors have not taken entire units 
with them, meaning that while the defections may damage moral, they have not caused 
the army apparatus to disintegrate.
185
 The presence of Sunni chiefs of staff in the army 
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and the close relationship that officers have to the ruling party reduces the army's 
sectarian nature and has helped ensure its cohesion.
186
 
 
 
5.4.2 Secondary parties 
 
The Assad regime has not faced the protests alone, but is receiving help from a 
variety of actors. Hizbollah has long been accused of being involved in Syria, but there 
has been no doubt of its involvement since October 2012 when one of its leaders was 
killed while fighting in Syria. 
187
 International Crisis Group states that "Hizbollah is 
directly engaged in a far-reaching battle against those it denounces as Sunni 
fundamentalists (takfiris) allied with Israel, a denomination it uses to encompass large 
swathes of the opposition." 
188
 In addition to being a long-time ally of the Assad regime, 
Hizbollah views the conflict in Syria as a sectarian one in which the Assad regime is 
fighting against Sunni and Western forces intent on its destruction. Iran has also been 
accused by Western governments of giving more aid to the Syrian regime as the conflict 
intensifies. 
189
 The conflict is exacerbating tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslims, 
aided by the Assad regime's propaganda against Sunni extremists and the presence of 
radical Islamic groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra among the opposition. Evidence of this 
divide is obvious when the number of foreign Shia fighters flooding in to aid the regime 
is taken into account. For example, one brigade called 
Abu Fadl al-Abbas suggest that upwards of 10,000 volunteers – all of them Shia 
Muslims and many from outside Syria – have joined their ranks in the past year 
alone. The group's raison d’être is to be custodian of Shia holy sites, especially 
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Sayyida Zeinab, a golden-domed Damascus landmark, but its role has taken it to 
most corners of Syria's war. It is now a direct battlefield rival, both in numbers 
and power, for Jabhat al-Nusra, the jihadist group that takes a prominent role 
among opposition fighting groups. 
190
  
Recruitment centers for the brigade have opened in Iraq, and new recruits are told that 
they are fighting for the Syrian regime, not just Shiite shrines. 
191
 Alongside Hizbollah, 
Iran supports the Assad regime by sending fighters and weapons. In fact, the Syrian 
opposition acknowledges (and perhaps overdramatizes) Iran's role in the conflict, with 
al-Tawhid Brigade Commander Abdulkader Saleh stating “Iran and Hezbollah are the 
ones who are continuing the war in Syria.” 192 Without the support of these valuable 
Shiite allies, the Assad regime might have been forced into negotiations with the 
opposition.  
From the beginning, Russia has taken a strong stance against the United States 
and Europe, in part due to Russia's realist worldview that prioritizes state sovereignty 
over humanitarian intervention. Russia also supports the Assad regime and is loathe to 
see him replaced with a potentially less-friendly government in the region, since Syria is 
one of the last Middle Eastern countries to be under Russian influence. The Syrian port 
of Tartus is Russia's only naval resupply facility outside the former Soviet Union and 
Russia’s weapons sales to Damascus have always been brisk. 193  Trenin (2013) 
identified four pillars of Moscow's support for Syria: its position on the changing 
international order, including its desire for the UN Security Council to mandate and 
oversee all use of international force; the effects of the Arab Spring, which Russia sees 
as bringing more instability to the region and the overthrow of secular authorities; its 
material interests in Syria, which are modest but worth maintaining; and the role of 
religion in the conflict, where it wishes to protect Christian minorities and prevent the 
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spread of radical Islam.
194
 Moscow is consequently hostile to the Syrian National 
Council and Free Syrian Army, viewing them as Western pawns and radical Islamists, 
respectively. Russia (along with China) has consistently blocked the UN Security 
Council from passing resolutions against the Assad government. Beyond preventing 
international intervention, Human Rights First accuses Russia of being one of the Assad 
regime's staunchest enables, sending "continual provision of military equipment via air 
and sea, supplies of diesel fuel that powers Syria’s infantry weaponry and tanks, and 
financial access that helps the regime fund its crimes."
195
 At the same time, Russia was 
unable to use its influence to convince Assad to end the violence, and Russia has almost 
no legitimacy as a mediator among the opposition due to its ties with the regime.
196
 
The last secondary party to the Syrian conflict is Turkey, which actually did not 
begin as a secondary party but as an interested third party. When the Assad regime 
faced its first protests, Turkey immediately recognized the need for Assad to respond 
carefully. As Dr. Aras describes, Turkey once again had a three stage formula. First, 
Turkey began with engagement. Turkish officials believed from the beginning that they 
could influence Damascus' reaction, as Dr. Aras explained the mentality at the time: 
"We have invested a lot in Assad…We can, to some extent, have an influence on Assad. 
This was the Turkish assumption."
197
 During the early stages of the protests and even 
the regime's initial use of force against the protesters, Turkish officials seem to have 
believed that they could guide Assad's response. What followed was engagement with 
the Assad regime for several months in 2011. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu went 
back and forth to Damascus about 9-10 times during this period and encouraged Assad 
to propose solid plans for transformation, allow for the formation of new political 
parties, run in elections, and other attempts at appeasing the protesters. At the same 
time, Turkey offered development aid and planning aid, promising to work on Syria's 
emerging issues with the international community. In a sense, Turkey was offering to be 
a partner with Syria to ensure that the steps Turkey suggested could be carried out 
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effectively. On March 28, 2011 Erdoğan publically called on Assad to listen to his 
people and not suppress their cries for more freedom.
198
 The next day, Erdoğan 
announced that he spoke with Assad ("Sayin Esad"), who agreed to implement reforms 
such as abolishing the State of Emergency. In April and May 2011 Erdoğan continued 
to make statements indicating Turkish support for Assad, and sending delegations to 
Syria.  
But in August 7, 2011, Erdoğan expressed his disappointment with Assad at an 
Iftar dinner speech in Istanbul, saying that the Turkish government's patience was at an 
end after hoping that Assad would implement the promised reforms. Erdoğan stated that 
he was sending Foreign Minister Davutoğlu to Syria with a forceful message, and how 
Assad answered the message would shape Turkey's next moves.
199
 He further stated that 
he did not consider the Syrian crisis as a foreign problem, but a domestic one due to the 
850 km border, shared culture, history, and relatives. Therefore, Erdoğan concluded, 
Turkey cannot just watch what happens in Syria, but will listen and do what is 
necessary.
200
 This speech is an important example of how Erdoğan appeals for 
intervention based on shared heritage, similar to his statements regarding the need for 
intervention in Somalia.  
Dr. Aras stated that the Turkish government's engagement with the Assad 
regime lasted for about 10 months, but this timeline necessarily overlaps with the time 
when Turkey began talking to the opposition. Even if Turkey began urging the Assad 
regime to respond to the protesters with moderation as early as January 2011, before the 
protests had hardly begun, other scholars have identified August 2011 as the date when 
Turkey began to openly host the Syrian opposition.
201
 Dr. Aras also stated that Turkey 
did not speak with the opposition while speaking with Assad, and once Turkey started 
working with the opposition, they no longer spoke with Assad. Therefore, the timeframe 
of engagement with Assad and the opposition cannot overlap. So there is some 
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confusion over how long Turkey actually tried to work with Assad, which although a 
minor detail perhaps speaks to the rapidity with which Turkey switched sides. Since the 
protests hardly began until March 2011 and Turkey broke off diplomatic relations with 
the Assad regime in August 2011, it is reasonable to assume that Turkey only spent six 
months (during actual protests) attempting to influence Assad. This is not to discount 
the many years of engagement that Turkey had already experienced with the Syrian 
regime, only to point out that active engagement during the protests was more limited 
than perhaps many people realize.  
Unfortunately the Assad regime ostensibly accepted the need for reform but did 
not agree with Turkish officials about the extent of reform necessary. Therefore, the 
opposition was not willing to accept the small reforms proposed by the Assad 
administration. When the government began reacting violently toward the protesters, 
Dr. Aras described the Assad regime's actions as "almost a collective punishment of its 
own people."  At that point, Turkey switched to the second step in its plan; isolation. 
Turkey limited communication with the regime and stepped back from the conflict, but 
this did not last long. Almost immediately Turkey transitioned into the third step, 
intervention. As Dr. Aras stated, "Turkish foreign policy is to never be in a position to 
intervene…it's not on the Turkish foreign policy maker's agenda." Despite this 
sentiment, several complex dynamics which will be discussed in more detail in 
subsequent sections caused Turkey to not just isolate the Syrian regime, but to become 
one of the most active players in the conflict through their support of the Syrian 
opposition. In contrast to Dr. Aras's clearly delineated steps of isolation and then 
intervention, some scholars perceived that Turkey went directly from engaging with 
Assad to assisting the opposition, as Cebeci and Ustun (2012) pointed out, "Once it was 
clear that the regime would not respond constructively to Turkish advice and instead 
insist on using force against its citizens, Turkey took a clear stance against Assad and 
started openly hosting the Syrian opposition in August 2011."
202
 Dr. Aras elaborated on 
Turkey's reasoning during the break with Assad, stating that the war had degenerated 
into a proxy war with almost no chance for a political settlement; Turkey decided that 
Assad was no longer a legitimate actor and any solution to the Syrian conflict needed to 
happen without him.   
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Clearly, it did not take long for the Turkish government to shift from 
supportively encouraging Assad to a firm decision that his leadership of the Syrian 
government was no longer possible. Whether Turkey's shift was too hasty, and 
prevented it from playing a stronger role as a mediator, or whether it was the only 
option in the face of the regime's brutality, is a point of contention. Still, Turkey's shift 
to supporting the opposition in itself is not enough to transform Turkey from an 
interested third party to a secondary party. This transformation occurred slowly, as 
mortar shells began to kill Turkish civilians in border towns; the Turkish government 
allowed opposition groups to cross back-and-forth over the border, often smuggling 
weapons and foreign fighters; Turkey was accused of providing weapons and training to 
opposition elements, including jihadi groups; and Turkey became the most vocal 
international community member calling for humanitarian intervention. The slide from 
interested third party to secondary party will become more clear during the discussion 
of the conflict dynamics.  
 
 
5.4.3 Interested third parties 
 
Saudi Arabia has thus far been invested in the outcome of the Syrian conflict but 
was initially hesitant to support the opposition; especially its Islamist elements. A 
member of the Saudi establishment explained: “Saudi Arabia opposes what Turkey and 
Qatar are doing: We will support neither the Muslim Brotherhood nor the Salafis. The 
friction caused by Turkey running the show in the north led Saudi to switch to Jordan in 
the fall of 2012. The switch wasn’t visible because the Jordanians didn’t want this to be 
public – although ultimately they can’t prevent it from being known. Saudi Arabia also 
enjoys more leverage over Jordan than it does over Turkey.” 203 At the same time, Saudi 
Arabia is united with Qatar and Turkey against the Assad regime. All three Sunni 
Muslim governments desire to lessen Iran's influence in the region and prevent it from 
gaining a major victory if the Assad regime withstands the conflict. Conversely, they 
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hope that a new Sunni government in Damascus would weaken Iran's power in the 
region to their benefit. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and Qatar especially believe that a 
Sunni regime in Damascus could increase their influence over Shia-dominated Iraq by 
strengthening the currently-marginalized Iraqi Sunnis.
204
 Additionally, the Assad 
regime's demise would weaken Hezbollah in Lebanon, another key area where the Gulf 
States would like to see their influence increase.
205
 However, in contrast to Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar has allied itself with the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the region and 
has actively supported them and other extremist groups in the Syrian opposition. 
206
 It is 
difficult to track the flow of weapons and cash from the Gulf States to various 
opposition groups, causing Saudi Arabia and the West to grow concerned over whether 
the weapons will ultimately end up in the hands of radical Islamists who could then 
further upset the regional balance of power. Still, Saudi Arabia has criticized the U.S. 
for only providing non-lethal aid to the rebels, and has pushed Europe to arm them.
207
  
  The United States has thus far been more cautious in its involvement in the 
conflict than Arab governments or even the European Union. While the US agrees with 
Turkey that Assad should no longer have power in Syria, the media has frequently 
reported on the division between Obama and Erdoğan over how deeply the US should 
be committed to the conflict. Prior to Erdoğan's meeting with Obama in Washington 
and right after the Reyhanli bombings, the media reported that "Erdoğan has pressed 
Washington to provide military assistance to rebels trying to oust Assad, but Obama has 
resisted. Erdoğan is expected to raise reports that Assad has used chemical weapons 
against the rebels to urge Obama to take a more aggressive stance." 
208
 The U.S. sent a 
group of 27 soldiers to Gaziantep in January 2013 to operate NATO-controlled Patriot 
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missile defense barriers near the Syrian border.
209
 Then, in February 2013, it pledged 
$60 million in non-lethal assistance to the Syrian National Coalition, along with food 
and medical supplies which would go directly to the Free Syrian Army through the 
Supreme Military Council.
210
 The Syrian opposition barely expressed gratitude for the 
aid and sought to downplay the existence of extremist elements in the opposition while 
pushing for military aid. In April the U.S. agreed to double its aid, reaching a total of 
$250 million, including 'battlefield support equipment' such as body armor, but still 
refused to provide lethal assistance.
211
 Finally in March 2014 the U.S. authorized the 
provision of anti-tank guided missiles to the rebels, the most advanced weapons to be 
donated thus far in the conflict.
212
 In June 2014 President Obama requested Congress to 
authorize $500 million for U.S. military training and equipment to 'moderate' Syrian 
rebels.
213
 However, there are logistical hurdles to getting the aid to the rebels, and if 
approved, it is unlikely to start until mid-2015. In the meantime, the U.S. and allies have 
began accelerating the supply of arms and ammunition to some Syrian opposition 
groups through the Turkish border.
214
 
The European Union, mainly driven by the United Kingdom and France, has taken a 
typically cautious approach to the Syrian conflict but has increased its insistence on the 
need for Assad to leave in recent months.  Jon Wilks, the United Kingdom 
Representative to the Syrian Opposition, outlined Britain's principles for involvement in 
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the conflict at the Istanbul Conference on Mediation (2013).
215
 These principles are 
similar to the European Union's and are: 
 Give more support to National Coalition and in different areas.  
 Ask the opposition to reach out to center ground and to all communities hesitant 
to join opposition.  
 The need for more unity with the international community and Security Council. 
Iran has to be part of the solution and mediation.  
 Britain agrees that Assad must go. Even Russia and Iran realize that a military 
solution will fail. Alawites must get on board with this political solution.  
 Whatever Britain does must be aimed at saving Syrian lives. It will be justified 
to the public and parliament on that basis. Can we do more to change the crisis 
trajectory to bring death rates down?  
Though British Prime Minister David Cameron has indicated his support for military 
action, Parliament failed to pass the proposal in August 2013. The French government 
has also been heavily involved with providing intelligence to and about the Syrian 
opposition; evaluating which elements of the opposition are stable enough to warrant 
European support. 
216
 President Francois Hollande also indicated that France would 
support a military intervention if led by the United States.
217
  
 Collectively, the countries seeking to support the Syrian opposition have formed 
a loose coalition called the "Friends of Syria" which consists of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
The United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
France, Italy, and the United States. In a June 2013 communique the group urged each 
member to "provide urgently all the necessary material and equipment to the opposition 
on the ground, each country in its own way" through the Syrian Supreme Military 
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Council. 
218
 In a May 2014 communique, the group agreed to take coordinated steps to 
increase support for the moderate opposition, remove Syria's chemical weapons, refer 
Syria to the International Criminal Court, and deliver more humanitarian aid across the 
border into Syria.
219
 The goal of referring Syrian government officials to the ICC for 
war crimes was thwarted in May 2014 however, when Russia and China vetoed the 
Security Council resolution.  
 
 
5.5 Conflict dynamics 
 
 
5.5.1 Precipitating events 
 
The initial protests which began in 2011 were very small. One person set himself 
on fire on January 26, 2011 but it had little effect on the population, in stark contrast to 
Tunisia. A few people gathered in several cities in February 2011, but the real protests 
began in March 2011, when a group of school children in Dera'a wrote "down with the 
system" on the wall of their school. Their subsequent arrest and torture caused more 
intense protests. The regime responded to the protesters with violence, killing several 
people.
220
 On March 24, 2011 the government announced reforms and pay increases for 
government workers. Bashar gave televised speeches to the People's Assembly, Cabinet, 
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and Damascus University in late March, when he blamed armed gangs and foreign 
conspirators for the violence. 
221
 
In order to avoid their fates, Bashar attempted to do exactly the opposite of what 
Tunisia's Ali and Egypt's Mubarak did in reaction to protests. In late March Bashar 
formed a committee to study the possible termination of the emergency law, which had 
been in effect since 1963 and was used to justify repression. A new Prime Minister was 
also announced. By March 15th protests erupted in Deraa, Dayr-al-Zor, al-Hasaka, 
Hama, and a few parts of Damascus. Throughout March the protests intensified, and 
Fridays were especially important as people streamed out of Friday prayers to protest in 
city centers. Even though most of the protests were peaceful, some violence did occur 
and Baath party headquarters and other government offices started to be attacked.  
By March 29th there were also pro-regime demonstrations in parts of Damascus, 
Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and Tartus. In early April the government announced 
concessions to Kurds (who make up about 10% of the population) and instituted 
policies in favor of religious Sunni Muslims (such as rehiring teachers who were fired 
for wearing the niqab, closing casinos, and other measures). By April 14th political 
prisoners were released. On April 16th Assad announced the lifting of the emergency 
law and pledged to tackle economic problems, but his speech did not focus on political 
reform. On April 21st the emergency law was lifted but replaced with other legislation 
designed to be equally restrictive. During the first week of April government snipers 
appeared and the protests started to result in more deaths. By late April there were 
around 100 reported deaths and rumors began to spread about government soldiers who 
were wounded when they refused to fire on protesters. This was the environment when 
Turkey began its attempts to influence the Assad regime. 
222
 Now, nearly four years into 
the conflict, the initial isolated protests and rumors of violence seem a world away from 
the civil war and humanitarian disaster the country faces today.   
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5.5.2 Issue emergence, transformation, and proliferation  
 
 The conflict has gone from being isolated protests over the treatment of students 
caught creating anti-regime graffiti; to calls for Assad to step down; to a civil war; to a 
regional war between the Assad regime, opposition groups, and extremist groups such 
as ISIS. The conflict's transformation illustrates how issues can change quickly, new 
actors can become involved, and opposing parties can become polarized.  
In late April 2011, exiles formed an opposition group called the National 
Initiative for Change and called for a peaceful democratic transition from Assad rule, 
the first time there were calls for Assad to step down. Until that point, the protests 
generally revolved around the need for political reform, and Assad had responded 
tepidly with concessions to minority groups, plans for 'national dialogue', the 
appointment of a new prime minister, and finally, a plan to abolish the emergency law. 
Soon, these gestures were not enough. By August 2011, the U.S., France, Germany, and 
Britain called for Assad's resignation, along with the Syrian people. Also in August, the 
Syrian National Council was formed, moving the uprising one step closer to civil war. 
By Fall 2011, Syria has spiraled into civil war.  
Unfortunately, this was not the last time the conflict would transform. Jihadi 
groups became active in Syria around mid-2012, and had taken over certain areas of the 
country by Spring 2013. As jihadi groups proliferated, Israel's director of military 
intelligence called Syria the "center of global jihad," concerns that were echoed by 
Jordan.
223
 Now, the conflict in Syria is considered a three-way war, as Free Syrian 
Army moderate opposition groups battle not only the Assad regime, but al-Qaeda 
backed extremist groups. Furthermore, as ISIS gains power in Syria, it has also been 
able to make massive gains in Iraq. As one Iraq analyst stated, "Syria has a much 
greater impact on Iraq than Iraq has on Syria. Having this rear base in Raqqa has been 
great for ISIS – it's what allowed them to organize and recruit and train their 
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fighters."
224
 The conflict is once again on the verge of transformation; this time, from a 
civil war to a regional conflagration.  
 
 
5.5.3 Polarization  
 
After trying for several months to convince the Assad regime to stop responding 
to the protests with violence, Turkey completely switched sides and began supporting 
the Syrian opposition. The switch was abrupt in the sense that Turkey cut off all 
relations with the Assad regime and began exclusively supporting the opposition, 
refusing to maintain ties with Assad. However, the fact that Turkey would begin 
supporting the opposition was not unexpected. There was a slow process of polarization 
between the Assad and Erdoğan governments which began just a few months after the 
protests started. In May 2011 Turkey still publicly supported the Assad government 
remaining in control of Syria while taking into account some of the protestors' demands, 
but privately, government officials were starting to question whether Assad was really 
invested in the changes necessary to save the country.
225
Analysts were already pointing 
out that Turkey was continuing to engage with Assad partially out of fear of ceding that 
relationship to Iran, which would quickly step in to become Assad's champion if Turkey 
cut him off.
226
 In June 2011, Turkey began welcoming defecting Syrian soldiers and 
announced that it would send humanitarian assistance over the Syrian border. Turkish 
rhetoric was still not too harsh; Foreign Minister Davutoğlu  stated at the time: 
"Regional people's demands are normal, rightful and legitimate. Meeting those demands 
will make our region a more stable, more democratic and more prosperous region. We 
are ready to do our utmost to help our region complete this transition process in a 
healthy way."
227
 Turkey seemed to embark on its last-ditch effort to sway Assad in 
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August 2011, when Davutoğlu  went to Damascus along with envoys from India, Brazil, 
and South Africa, to convince him to stop the violence.
228
 In response, the Syrian 
government stated, "If Davutoğlu is to deliver a firm message to Syria, he will hear a 
firmer reply regarding the Turkish stance."
229
 By late September 2011, Erdoğan stated 
that he was "not very optimistic" that Syria's future could include Assad.
230
 By October, 
the Syrian opposition met in Istanbul and created the Syrian National Council, which 
began operating out of Turkey along with the Free Syrian Army. The polarization 
between the Erdoğan and Assad regimes was complete. 
Polarization has also occurred between Turks and the Syrian refugees they are 
hosting. Turkey's open-border policy for Syrian refugees and fighters has led to mistrust 
of the government by Alawite populations and general discontent with the proliferating 
number of Syrians in Turkish villages. According to the International Crisis Group: 
The situation also demonstrates Turkey’s limitations in imposing its will or 
shaping the arc of the war: its policies essentially have erased the border, 
accelerated southern Anatolia’s integration with northern Syria and forced 
Ankara to take ownership of the latter’s predicament but failed to affect more 
important dynamics further south.
231
 
However, Turkish officials seem to believe that they can change the border situation if 
desired; as a senior Turkish official told the Crisis Group, “I agree that borders have 
become meaningless. But if need be, we can harden them again."
232
 The belief that the 
borders can be reconstituted at will is perhaps not shared by the minority populations of 
the affected areas. As Şefik Çirkin, an MHP deputy from Hatay told the International 
Crisis Group, "The Alawites think that when the Syrian war is finished [these al-Qaeda 
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affiliates] will turn their guns on them. Sometimes impressions can outweigh facts."
233
 
The fear that the heavily armed Syrian population in Turkey, steeped in violence, will 
become hostile to their Turkish protectors is a real one which is articulated more by 
NGOs and research organizations such as International Crisis Group than by the 
Turkish press. 
 
 
5.5.4 Spiraling  
 
Turkey's practically open-border policy with Syria allowed the Free Syrian 
Army to set up command in the country while still being able to cross into Syria. By 
mid-2012 Turkey was serving as a conduit for weapons being funneled from Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia into Syria. Around this time, relations between Turkey and Syria 
deteriorated. In April 2012 Syrian regime forces fired across the Turkish border into a 
refugee camp for the first time. Then on June 22, 2012, a Turkish military airplane was 
shot down by Syrian government forces. After Turkish civilians were killed for the first 
time when Syrian government forces fired into Akçakale, the Turkish parliament 
authorized military operations against Syria the very next day, October 4, 2012. Despite 
Turkey's hesitance to work with the international community on some aspects of the 
Syrian crisis, such as refugee camps, Turkey accepted the deployment of NATO Patriot 
missiles on the Turkish border in January 2013. Yet, the precautions were not enough to 
prevent two more massive tragedies from occurring. In February 2013, a car bomb 
attack at the Cilvegözü border post killed seventeen people, and in May 2013 car bombs 
in Reyhanlı killed 52 and wounded over 100 people. The war has also caused a black 
market of illicit traders, smugglers, and traffickers to spring up along the Turkish-Syrian 
border. Tea stands and small shops now serve as fronts for smugglers to get people, 
weapons, and other equipment from Turkey to Syria, a task which, despite Turkey's 
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claims to the contrary, is not described as difficult by a group of investigative journalists 
visiting in July 2014.
234
 
As the conflict progressed, radical Islamic extremist groups developed first a 
foothold, then a large swath of territory, across Syria and Iraq. Turkey has been 
criticized by the U.S. and other Western allies for being slow to recognize extremist 
groups as such, and has even been accused of assisting groups such as al-Nusra. The 
criticism became even more intense after al-Nusra announced their alliance to Al-Qaeda 
in April 2013. For example, Today's Zaman columnist Lale Kemal quoted a Western 
official as saying “Any means necessary for Assad to go, even if it means through al-
Nusra, appears to be valid for Turkey. But this is a very short-sighted view,” in April 
2013.
235
 The U.S. refers to the largest extremist group, ISIS, as "a transnational Sunni 
Islamist insurgent and terrorist group."
236
 By September 2013, ISIS was fighting the 
FSA near Aleppo, and FSA fighters considered it as big a threat as the Assad regime. 
ISIS is strongest in Raqqah and Syria’s eastern provinces of Dayr az Zawr and Hasakah, 
after facing battles and disagreements with other Syrian extremist groups such as al-
Nusra. In January 2014, groups including the Islamic Front, al-Nusra, and the FSA 
launched an attack against ISIS, pushing them out of Aleppo but not managing to clear 
them out of Raqqah. However, the brief coalition of fighters could not maintain control, 
and by June 2014 ISIS had retaken territory stretching from outside Aleppo to Eastern 
Iraq, declaring it a caliphate led by its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
237
According to the 
U.S. government, ISIS' gains in Iraq could significantly destabilize Syria, as captured 
U.S.-origin military equipment provided to Iraqi security forces has already appeared in 
Syria along with Iraqi militants.
238
 ISIS is a magnate for foreign fighters, including 
militants from Pakistan and Afghanistan in addition to Iraq. Execution of Alawites and 
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Shiites along with moderate Sunnis and opposition fighters have led to massive waves 
of refugees and even greater chaos. After ISIS fighters captured the Mosul Dam in Iraq 
and made territorial gains nearly to Erbil, the capital of the Kurdish area of Northern 
Iraq, the US worked with Iraqi troops and Peshmerga (Kurdish) fighters to retake it and 
confirmed that they would begin a long-term strategy to defeat ISIS. 
239
 Though it is 
perhaps too little, too late to stop the spiraling that has already occurred, in July 2014 
Turkey announced efforts to limit the flow of jihadists going into Syria and Iraq, 
including Turkish citizens. Efforts include increased border protection and interviewing 
families of Turks who went to fight in order to build a profile of the jihadists and 
prevent them from crossing back into Turkey.
240
 Turkey also finally blacklisted al-
Nusra as a terrorist group in June 2014.  
The use of chemical weapons was also a sign of spiraling violence. The U.N. 
Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab 
Republic's report concluded in September 2013 that surface-to-surface rockets 
containing sarin were used in the Ghouta area of Damascus against civilians on a 
'relatively large scale,' while reports of attacks using chlorine gas in Hama province 
surfaced in mid-April 2014.
241
 After the Obama administration threatened military 
action in August 2013 due to the use of chemical weapons, the Assad regime agreed to 
destroy all of its chemical weapons stocks and production facilities. As of June 23, 
2014, all of Syria's declared chemical weapons have been removed from the country.
242
 
Refugees began arriving in Turkey in April 2011, before Ankara switched its 
support from Assad to the opposition. As the refugee influx continued, Turkey, 
believing as did most of the international community that the conflict would be short-
lived, extended an open-door policy to the refugees and welcomed them into the 
                                                          
239
 BBC News. (2014). Timeline: How the Syria conflict has spread.  
240
 BBC Monitoring Europe. (2014). Turkey boosts measures to stop jihadist flow to 
Syria, Iraq.  
241
 Congressional Research Service. (2014). Armed conflict in Syria: Overview and 
U.S. response.  
242
 Ibid.   
84 
 
country under a legal framework known as 'temporary protection'.
243
 As the conflict 
progressed, the refugee camps were pushed past capacity and Turkish towns along the 
border began to be inundated with Syrian refugees and fighters. Now, there are an 
estimated 1.5 million refugees living in Turkey, and tensions are high between them and 
the Turks, who accuse refugees of causing violence, increasing rent, and accepting 
wages lower than Turks would be willing to, thus creating tougher competition for jobs. 
However, Turkey has responded to the wave of Syrian refugees, asylum seekers, and 
migrants with what most international observers have determined to be great 
compassion. First, the government extended the 'temporary protection' designation to 
Syrian refugees in October 2011, giving them more legal rights than they would have as 
'guests'. This also committed the Turkish government to the principle of 'non-
refoulement', which is not forcing refugees to return to the country from which they fled 
violence, and to providing basic humanitarian services.
244
 Other steps taken by the 
Turkish government to improve services to refugees are the 'open-door policy', 
establishing a coordination committee led by a deputy prime minister, and coordinating 
between the governors of the border provinces.
245
 The camps themselves are heralded as 
the finest seen in any conflict environment, and international praise includes an article 
by the New York Times called 'How to build a perfect refugee camp'. However, Turkey 
has been criticized for discouraging international aid to the refugees and maintaining 
tight control of the camps. As Turks recognize that the crisis has no end in sight, the 
Erdoğan government may slowly allow for more international involvement. It must also 
begin to consider what to do with the refugees who are stuck in legal limbo without the 
ability to work or in some cases, provide their children with education. This is 
especially pressing for the majority of refugees who live outside the camps. Voluntary 
return is unlikely; even if the violence ended, the large-scale destruction and presence of 
extremist groups would discourage many refugees from returning, as would a settlement 
that left the Assad regime in power.
246
 Resettlement into other countries for such a large 
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amount of refugees is also not feasible, though it is a possibility for the most vulnerable. 
Ultimately, this leaves Turkey with the task of accommodating the bulk of the refugees 
through integration. Rumors of refugees being granted citizenship rights abound, 
causing considerable distress for opposition parties who recognize the loyalty refugees 
would have for the AKP if this were to happen. However, government officials have 
thus far denied the possibility of refugees becoming citizens.
247
 No matter how the 
Turkish government decides to deal with the influx, officials along with the refugees 
themselves seem resigned to their presence being a long-term reality.  
 
 
5.5.5 Stereotyping and mirror imaging 
 
As described in previous sections, the conflict's progression has seen the steady 
erosion of 'moderate' opposition elements as fighters gravitate toward the extremist 
groups. Similarly, everyone involved in the conflict, from widows to diplomats to 
national leaders, have hardened their own positions and created stereotypes regarding 
the opposing parties. Importantly, the Erdoğan regime has completely changed the tone 
of its rhetoric regarding Assad, going so far as to change the spelling of the name by 
which they refer to him. AKP leaders:  
changed the name of the Syrian leader from “Esad” to “Esed” during the crisis. 
And as the political leadership started to use the new term, all the pro-
government Turkish media used it as well…after this discourse change, the 
Turkish Language Institution ruled in June 2011 that the new version, Esed, is 
the correct one.
248
 
Erdoğan began to stereotype Assad as the typical brutal dictator, whereas just a few 
months before he was hopeful that Assad would avoid such a fate. As early as July 
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2012, Erdoğan claimed in a national speech that the Assad regime was "desperately" 
attacking its own people, showing their panic, desperation, and insanity. 
249
 He went on 
to say that Assad had "blood on his hands" and would meet the same fate as previous 
dictators.
250
 According to some commentators, Erdoğan's rhetoric is coming from 
intense emotion. Erdoğan is: 
enraged that Assad didn't heed his advice to curtail violence and embark on 
reforms, humiliated that for years he has been talking up the Syrian president to 
partners in the West as the man to reform Syria. "Erdoğan is [angry] at Bashar 
for not listening to him, the big brother," Turkey specialist Barkey said. "There 
is a danger for Bashar that Erdoğan may personalize this."251 
Erdoğan's rhetoric against Assad intensified in August 2011, saying: “Those who sent 
scores of Muslims to the gallows are not up on their feet now; look where they are 
going on a stretcher … Those who do not learn a lesson will suffer,” in comparison to 
Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. 
252
 
As the conflict progressed and violence came over the Turkish border, Turks 
began to stereotype the Syrian refugees in their midst as well as question the 
government's Syria policy. In response to questions regarding the Reyhanlı bombing, 
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu  stated that "those who linked this atrocity to the 
government’s Syrian policy were committing a crime against humanity."253 In the wake 
of the bombing, the AKP government and CHP opposition began attacking each other, 
with Erdoğan stating, “Activities at the level of treason by some dark people in disguise 
as journalists, traders, and businessman have been detected in Hatay and they are being 
arrested and submitted to the judiciary," while accusing the CHP of being connected to 
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these treasonous activities.
254
 Meanwhile, CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu accused the AKP 
government of not acting on intelligence warnings before the bombing, and of helping 
to perpetuate the Syrian conflict, saying “they are sending these militants to Syria 
saying ‘Go kill your brothers.’ They are handing them arms and putting money in their 
pockets” in reference to the AKP's support for Syrian opposition groups.255 Of course, 
this rhetoric sounds more innocent when compared to his inflammatory statement that 
Erdoğan is the "terrorist chieftain" for Syria, implying that the Syrian opposition is a 
terrorist group.
256
 The rhetoric has only intensified by summer 2014. A video was 
leaked in March 2014 which allegedly shows a conversation between Foreign Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu , Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioğlu, National 
Intelligence Organization (MIT) head Hakan Fidan and Deputy Chief of General Staff 
Gen. Yaşar Güler discussing how Turkey could intervene in Syria, and how intervention 
could be justified. In response, CHP deputy chairman Haluk Koç stated,  
Are you [the government] still making plans to intervene in Syria via a series of 
plots? Have you plotted an attack by the Syrian opposition forces on Turkey, to 
be blamed on the Assad regime, to convince people of the threat coming from 
the Syrian regime… Such plots and plans do not make you a hero but turns the 
plotters into war criminals.
257
 
The inflammatory statements by politicians led some journalists to accuse both the AKP 
and CHP of increasing polarization not only in Turkey, but among all the parties in the 
conflict.
258
 
 Of course, Assad hit back against the Erdoğan government with his own harsh 
words. In April 2013, he accused Turkey of assisting terrorists in coalition with Israel, 
and stated, "when the prime minister or the government or officials get involved in 
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shedding Syrian people's blood, there is no place for bridges between me and them or 
the Syrian people that don't respect them."
259
 In a wide-reaching interview with 
Turkey's Halk TV, Assad claimed that Turkey was supporting terrorists in order to see a 
Muslim Brotherhood-controlled Syria, and denied Turkish officials' claims that the 
conflict spiraled after he refused to listen to their advice, "as if Erdoğan is a sultan and I 
am his governor."
260
 In what was perhaps a prescient statement about Turkey's alleged 
support for some radical Islamist groups, Assad said "it is not possible to put terrorism 
in your pocket and use it as a card because it is like a scorpion that won't hesitate to 
sting you at the first opportunity."
261
 Assad has consistently claimed that supporting him 
is the only option besides supporting terror, and equates opposition supporters with 
terrorists.  
 
 
5.6 Conflict regulation potential 
 
 
 
5.6.1 Internal limiting factors 
 
According to Brookings, Turkish officials have lost hope that the conflict will 
end quickly; "a number of members of parliament from both the governing and 
opposition parties interviewed in January 2014 openly stated that they could see the 
conflict in Syria persisting for the next 10-15 years."
262
 This dismal view reflects the 
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reality that there are few internal or external limiting factors to the conflict, leading to 
limited conflict regulation potential. The Assad regime gets  supported and resupplied 
by Russia and Iran; the opposition is aided by the Friends of Syria including Turkey, the 
US, and the European Union; and ISIS supports itself through oil revenues. The never-
ending stream of resources being pumped into the conflict allows the parties to keep 
fighting and reduces the incentive to reach a negotiated settlement. As Jim Muir 
describes in a BBC article, there is not sufficient pressure on Assad to step down, nor is 
military victory by the opposition a strong possibility. Similarly, a negotiated settlement 
is remote. The only possibility for a settlement of the conflict is if the opposition makes 
extreme concessions to the Assad regime, or if external pressure forces the Assad 
regime to do the same. Until either of these possibilities occur, the civil war has 
degenerated into a war of attrition in an unstable stalemate whereby the Assad regime 
has the upper hand, but not enough to completely overpower the opposition.
263
 
Interestingly, the Syrian Kurds have emerged as a bright spot of peace in the 
northern part of Syria, if not an actual internal limiting factor. The Party for Democratic 
Unity (PYD) took control of Kurdish areas in northern Syria in July 2012 and 
proceeded to maintain peace in the area while generally staying out of the fights 
between the opposition and Assad regime; indifference reciprocated by the other parties 
in the conflict who also generally avoided PYD controlled areas. However, the entrance 
of ISIS into the conflict changed the PYD's calculations, as it showed no inhibition to 
attack Kurdish-controlled territory. If Erdoğan can maintain peace with the Kurds in 
Turkey and Syria, the PYD-controlled 450 miles of Syrian territory along the Turkish 
border may prove to provide a buffer between Turkey and ISIS.
264
 However, the current 
relationship between Erdoğan and the Syrian Kurds is not good, with the PYD accusing 
Turkey of allowing ISIS militants to cross back-and-forth over the border and attack 
Kurdish-controlled areas of Syria in July 2014, citing evidence that many captured or 
killed ISIS fighters have Turkish identity cards.
265
 Foreign fighters captured by Kurds 
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have claimed that they were trained in Turkish camps and that Turkish instructors teach 
at rebel camps in Syria, according to Saleh Muslim, the leader of the Kurdish 
Democratic Union Party, the biggest Kurdish faction in Syria.
266
 At the same time, 
Turkish Kurds from the PKK have been crossing the border to assist Syrian Kurds in the 
fight against ISIS.      
 
 
5.6.2 External limiting factors 
 
The best possibility for ending the conflict is if the U.S. becomes more involved, 
which looks increasingly likely after it recently bombed ISIS strongholds in Iraq. Yet, 
the relationship between Erdoğan and the U.S. has completely eroded over the course of 
the conflict. Many reports in the Turkish media, especially surrounding Erdoğan's visit 
to Washington in May 2013, emphasize Turkey's dependence on the U.S. and even 
Erdoğan's nearly pleading desire for President Obama to intervene in Syria. For 
example, a Hurriyet Daily News writer says in reaction to Obama's noncommittal 
attitude about intervention, "That was not exactly what Erdoğan actually wanted to hear. 
Erdoğan hoped he could convince Obama that Assad’s use of chemical weapons had 
violated the U.S.’s 'red lines,' but no, Washington DC was still to wait despite atrocities 
in Syria." 
267
 Erdoğan and Davutoğlu  were quick to deny allegations that Turkey was 
too dependent on U.S. intervention for the success of their Syria policy. But, the U.S.'s 
lack of intervention obviously strained the relationship. By July 2014, Erdoğan stated; 
"in the past, I was calling him (Obama) directly. Because I can't get the expected results 
on Syria, our foreign ministers are now talking to each other."
268
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Even if the U.S. intervened now, it is unclear whether the conflict could be de-
escalated.  The chief-of-staff of the FSA's Supreme Military Council, Abdelilah al-
Bashir, has criticized Washington for giving weapons directly to what the U.S. claims 
are moderate rebels on the ground, rather than going through the FSA. Bashir stated, 
"Providing support to individual battalions could turn the commanders of these 
battalions into warlords and they will be difficult to control in future. This could turn 
Syria into Afghanistan or Somalia."
269
 President Obama has also expressed cynicism 
about the U.S.'s power to affect change, saying "The notion that they were in a position 
to suddenly overturn not only Assad but also ruthless, highly-trained jihadists if we just 
sent a few arms is a fantasy."
270
 The problems of identifying "moderate" opposition 
groups to support, transporting the weapons or other aid to them safely, and 
communicating with them effectively, all make the possibility of providing enough 
military aid to quickly end the conflict slim. Furthermore, domestic U.S. opinion will 
probably prevent Obama from intervening on a large scale with "boots on the ground," 
as it appeared to in 2013 after the discovery of chemical weapons. Therefore, the U.S. is 
unlikely to play a large role as an external limiting factor.  
 
 
5.6.3 Interested or neutral third parties 
 
Though Turkey is now a secondary party to the conflict, various public, private, 
and charitable Turkish organizations are the most active in providing assistance to 
Syrians affected by the conflict, especially refugees within Turkey. Therefore, they fall 
under the category of 'interested or neutral third parties' helping to manage the conflict. 
The first level of aid comes from public administrative agencies. TIKA describes 
Turkey's response to the refugee crisis as "a fullscale mobilization of the Turkish public 
administration apparatus" involving governorships; municipalities; AFAD; Ministries of 
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Health, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Environment and Urbanization, National 
Education, Family and Social Policies, Food, Agriculture and Livestock; Turkish 
Armed Forces; TOKI; Department of Religious Affairs; and the Turkish Red 
Crescent.
271
 These efforts are all coordinated by the Office for Coordinating Syrian 
Guest Affairs, which has the largest development assistance budget of any Turkish 
public agency, with over $979 million spent in 2012.
272
 The Disaster and Emergency 
Management Presidency (AFAD) is another public agency which is heavily involved in 
helping Syrians in Turkey, handling Syrian guest affairs and providing financial support 
for Syrian refugees in Turkey.  
The second level of aid comes from Turkish NGOs and private charitable 
foundations. Interestingly, Syria was the second largest recipient of Turkish NGO aid in 
2012 with almost $20 million, while Somalia was the first with over $26 million.
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Turkey's Humanitarian Relief Foundation is one of the largest NGOs and has been 
supplying aid such as food packages to Syria since the beginning of the conflict. In 
April 2014, it sent fifteen trucks with one hundred tons of food packages into Syria in 
memory of the nine Mavi Marmara victims.
274
 The Society of Doctors of Earth has also 
been active in helping Syrians both in and out of Turkey. They provided $8 million 
worth of medicine to Syrian refugees along with other medical supplies to refugees in 
Turkey, examined refugees in Lebanon and Libya, transported injured Syrians to 
Turkey and treated them, and set up mobile clinics along the Lebanon-Syria border, to 
name a few projects.
275
 Kimse Yok Mu (Anybody there?) has also conducted various 
projects for Syrian refugees in Turkey, such as distributing food packages, blankets, and 
hygiene items; setting up mobile toilets and showers; constructing a playground and 
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medical center; and giving hot meals through a mobile soup kitchen.
276
 Dosteller 
(Friendly Hands) and Yardimeli (Helping Hand) are two more organizations working to 
help Syrian refugees by providing food aid and other supplies. These NGOs are 
providing valuable assistance to the millions of refugees and in some cases, internally 
displaced persons still inside Syria. However, just as the Turkish government has been 
accused of providing help indiscriminately to the Syrian opposition, including extremist 
groups, non-governmental organizations operating in the border areas have been 
accused of the same; offering non-lethal help to extremist fighters.
277
 In perhaps the 
most controversial case, an NGO called HİSADER (Haznedar Islamic Research, 
Sustenance and Helping Association) was accused of using a logo similar to ISIS's and 
sending young Turkish men into Syria to fight with the extremist group.
278
 Though the 
directors vehemently denied the charge, the charity shut down. All NGOs must be 
careful to avoid having their aid become another currency in the conflict through being 
monopolized by certain parties. So far, this does not seem to be a problem.  
Finally, there are now international NGOs operating in Turkey with the goal of 
aiding Syrian refugees. As of April 2014 there were twenty-four NGOs mostly from the 
U.S. who have received their authorizations to assist refugees in Turkey, with another 
twenty applications pending and ten rejections.
279
 Though Turkey was previously 
criticized for its unwillingness to work with international organizations and subsequent 
confusing, lengthy procedure for their registration, it now seems to have recognized the 
need for cooperation due to the indefinite length of the conflict. In May 2014, the U.S. 
announced efforts to ramp up support to Turkey and other countries such as Lebanon 
and Jordan affected by the Syrian conflict and hosting large numbers of refugees 
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through the "Counter-Terrorism Partnerships Fund" of up to $5 billion.
280
 The effort 
was criticized as being too little, too late, but it is clear that with the growing 
humanitarian need, international help is necessary.  
 
 
5.6.4 Techniques of conflict management 
 
 So far, several techniques have been attempted or suggested in an effort to 
manage the conflict. First, mediation between the opposing parties was attempted at the 
Geneva I and II conferences. In another attempt, various second and third parties 
attempted to support one of the primary opposing parties with overwhelming force in 
order to topple the Assad regime and thus, in theory, end the conflict. Finally, Turkey 
has consistently advocated for forceful humanitarian intervention by either the UN or a 
coalition of interested countries in order to overthrow the Assad regime. The attempt to 
arm the opposition has already been discussed extensively, but the Geneva conferences 
and Turkey's insistence on humanitarian intervention deserve a closer look. Lastly, in an 
interesting twist, some diplomats and commentators have encouraged giving Assad a 
second chance in light of the growing extremism in the Syrian opposition.  
 The first Geneva conference was held on 30 June 2012,  and was attended by a 
group of actors calling themselves the Action Group for Syria, including the 
Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, the Foreign 
Ministers of China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, Turkey, Iraq (Chair 
of the Summit of the League of Arab States), Kuwait (Chair of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers of the League of Arab States) and Qatar (Chair of the Arab Follow-up 
Committee on Syria of the League of Arab States), and the European Union High 
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. According to the Action Group's Final 
Communique, their goals were bringing an end to the violence and human rights abuses, 
launching a democratic, Syrian-led political process leading to a transition, and 
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maintaining the sovereignty, independence, national unity and territorial integrity of 
Syria. The Communique further identified steps to be taken in order to implement the 
Six Point Plan, and agreed on principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led transition. 
Significantly, it called for the establishment of a transitional governing body which 
could include members of the Assad regime, as long as it was formed on the basis of 
'mutual consent.'
281
 The Six Point Plan is an amendment to UN Security Council 
resolution 2042 backed by Kofi Annan and ostensibly accepted by the Assad regime. 
The six points are 1) committing to work with the Envoy (Annan, at the time) toward a 
Syrian-led political process 2) stopping the violence 3) ensuring provision of 
humanitarian assistance 4) releasing detained people and making the circumstances of 
those still in detention more transparent 5) ensuring that journalists have safe access to 
report in Syria and 6) respecting freedom of association and the right to demonstrate.
282
 
The Six Point Plan and subsequent Final Communique of the Action Group for Syria 
were the first and most optimistic documents released as part of the international 
community's efforts to mediate the conflict.  
 Next, The Friends of Syria Core Group of countries – the ‘London 11’, issued a 
communique on 22 October 2013 urging the adoption of the original Geneva 
Communique and the attendance to Geneva II, with a few modifications. By this point, 
the Assad regime was no longer granted the option of being a member of the transitional 
governing body (TGB), as the group specified, "We agree that when the TGB is 
established, Assad and his close associates with blood on their hands will have no role 
in Syria." The document also expressed concern over the use of chemical weapons and 
growing threat of extremism, while pledging increased aid to the moderate opposition. 
283
 
 None of the goals described in the Six Point Plan or subsequent Communiques 
had been achieved by early 2014, except the appointment of envoys to participate in the 
talks. Therefore, the Geneva II conference was held on 22 January 2014 in Montreux 
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and 23-31 January in Geneva with the aim of discussing the implementation of the Plan 
and subsequent Communiques. The Syrian National Coalition attended, but its largest 
bloc, the Syrian National Council, quit the Coalition in protest of its decision to engage 
in negotiations before Assad was ousted.
284
 The first round of talks began with even 
more hostility than expected, as Ahmad Jarba, the head of the National Coalition, 
insisted that Assad transfer power immediately to a transitional government, while 
members of the Syrian government coalition such as UN ambassador Bashar Jaafari and 
Foreign Minister Walid Muallem claimed that opposition supporters had "blood on their 
hands."
285
 The talks were also attended by Senior Officials from Egypt, France, 
Germany, Italy, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, who released a London 11 Communique on the 
Geneva II Conference on January 31. In the Communique, they praised the efforts of 
Joint Special Representative Brahimi for bringing the parties together, and the Syrian 
National Coalition, for continuing to attend the talks. At the same time, they accused the 
Assad regime of obstructing talks and using a “starve or surrender” strategy and “barrel 
bombs” against the Syrian people. This Communique outlined the international 
community's position going into the second round of talks held from 10-15 February.
286
  
 The second round of talks was no more productive than the first, and ended 
without setting a date for another meeting. The UN's mediator for Syria Lakhdar 
Brahimi blamed the failure squarely on the Syrian government delegation, who refused 
to negotiate the opposition's demands before focusing on their own. In fact, the talks 
never proceeded to actual negotiations, but only on what would be discussed and how. 
The main demand of the Syrian government is the ending of terrorism, which they 
define to include all opposition groups. The opposition's main concern is the 
establishment of a transitional governing body; one that does not include Assad. Despite 
the failure of the talks, the opposition also had an optimistic hope that it "had 
highlighted the government’s inflexibility and might prompt a stronger international 
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response."
287
 However, some commenters also blamed the fragmentation of the 
opposition for the talks' failure. The opposition's split over the decision to negotiate in 
the first place, along with its failure to include Kurdish groups or Al-Qaeda elements, 
meant that it was unable to negotiate with the Syrian regime from a united position.
288
 
Turkey seemed to play a very limited role in Geneva II, evidenced by the paucity of 
news articles referencing its involvement. This might be partially due to the Assad 
regime's anger at Turkish support for the opposition. In the lead-up to Geneva II, Syria's 
deputy foreign minister Faisal Muqdad criticized "the stupid Turkish policy which has 
compromised the Turkish people... by attracting Al-Qaeda" to its territory.
289
 With 
Erdoğan's harsh rhetoric against the Assad regime and the opposition's increasing 
fragmentation, Turkey was unable to play a role in uniting the opposition prior to the 
talks or in encouraging the Syrian delegation to compromise during the negotiations.  
Erdoğan has seemingly advocated military intervention on several occasions. In 
September 2013 he condemned the international community's failure to take action, 
using the analogy of campaigns against seal hunting, he said: "People turn the world 
upside down when a couple of seals are killed. It is unacceptable that the world remains 
silent as 100,000 people are killed."
290
 Erdoğan further signaled his desire for long-term 
military intervention, stating  "It cannot be a 24 hour hit-and-run. A limited military 
action will not satisfy us," leading a Turkish media commentator to call him "trigger-
happy."
291
 In response to the UN's failure to immediately intervene following the use of 
chemical weapons in the conflict, Erdoğan called on UN members to resign and for 
concerned countries to form their own United Nations separate from the five permanent 
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members of the Security Council who were preventing action.
292
 At the same time, he 
called for a 'coalition of the willing' similar to what was done in Bosnia in the absence 
of a Security Council resolution. However, Turkey was not joined by any international 
partners in its zeal to intervene. In April 2014 Erdoğan claimed that Syria and Turkey 
were at war, stating, "Syria is in a state of war with us. They are harassing our planes. 
They have martyred 74 of our brothers, and the tomb of Suleyman Sah is our land. An 
attack on it is an attack on 780,000 square kilometers. Can we remain silent about such 
a thing?"
293
 In fact, Turkish military forces did enter Syria during the same month in 
order to protect the tomb of Suleyman Sah (considered Turkish land due to an 
agreement signed in 1921 and recognized by the Syrian authorities after gaining 
independence). However, the UN Security Council will never authorize humanitarian 
intervention, due to Russia and China's veto power, and Turkey has not found any 
partners for its 'coalition of the willing' initiative. Therefore, humanitarian intervention 
does not appear to be a strong possibility for conflict management.     
With the decreasing influence of the 'moderate' opposition, it may be necessary 
for the Friends of Syria to accept supporting Islamist groups if it intends to continue 
arming the opposition. Finally, a few diplomats and commenters have recently 
suggested that the Assad regime is the 'least of all evils' option in Syria, where radical 
Islamist groups have gained territory and followers in comparison to the 'moderate' 
opposition, which is increasingly seen as ineffectual by supporters inside and outside of 
Syria. Ryan C. Crocker, a US diplomat with a long history of service in Syria, Iraq and 
Afghanistan, said, "We need to start talking to the Assad regime again," according to 
The New York Times. "It will have to be done very, very quietly. But bad as Assad is, 
he is not as bad as the jihadis who would take over in his absence," Crocker added.
294
 
Time will tell if Crocker's assessment proves correct and the international community 
suddenly reaches an agreement with the regime.  
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5.7 Conclusion 
 
 
 The discussion of Turkey's involvement in Syria enables us to see a clear 
progression from Turkey using its soft power to attempt to influence the Assad regime, 
to Turkey supporting the opposition, to advocating for forceful humanitarian 
intervention in the conflict. Throughout the entire process, Turkey has provided 
humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees through the variety of actors described 
above. Turkey has also taken several actions that could constitute forcible intervention 
in the conflict, yet the nature of Turkey's support to the opposition means that it cannot 
be labelled 'humanitarian' or 'military' intervention. Turkey has provided the opposition 
with an open border to cross back-and-forth into Syria, bringing fighters and weapons 
into the country. Many sources have also accused Turkey of providing the opposition 
with weapons, though Turkey has denied these allegations. Turkey's support for the 
opposition contributed significantly to the opposition's ability to maintain its survival 
and continue its war against the Assad regime, but was not enough to decisively enable 
it to win the conflict. This support, and especially Turkey's porous borders, has been 
criticized by international actors and Turks. At the same time, Turkey's humanitarian 
efforts in support of the Syrian refugees have been unparalleled, and praised widely by 
international actors and Syrians themselves. Thus, we see a tension between the positive 
results of Turkey's humanitarian aid to the refugees, and the negative perception of 
Turkey's intervention on behalf of the Syrian opposition.  
 The repercussions of Turkey's support for the opposition can perhaps be seen 
most fully in the effect it has had on Turkey's ability to mediate in the conflict. Due to 
its efforts since around 2009 to cultivate economic, cultural, and political ties with 
Syria, Turkey would have been in the best position compared to other international 
actors to offer mediation between the Assad regime and opposition, or between the 
Assad regime and international community. Looking at the qualities that Ahmet 
Davutoğlu claims are important for mediators to possess, such as neutrality, objectivity, 
and an ability to be a 'defender of shared values,' it  is hard to see how Turkey expected 
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to fulfill these qualities after breaking off ties with the Assad regime. Therefore, we 
must assume that Turkey had no intention of mediating between Assad and any other 
parties after the civil war began, and Turkey switched to supporting the opposition. 
Turkey might have expected mediation to be unnecessary because the Assad regime 
would fall quickly or the conflict would be settled by some other means. This seems to 
be in contradiction with Davutoğlu's statements about mediation being the ultimate 
instrument for peace. Ultimately, Turkey was too tied to the outcome of the Syrian 
conflict; the human ties between the countries are so close that Erdoğan claimed the 
conflict was domestic in nature, rather than foreign. Though Ufuk Gezer made the point 
that a mediator must have an 'innate understanding' of the conflict and mediate from an 
insider perspective, Turkey's investment in the Syrian conflict was simply too much to 
serve as an effective mediator in this instance.   
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
6.1 Revision of initial assumptions 
 
 
 In line with the principles for case study research outlined in my Methodology 
section, I had initial assumptions about my conclusions which were revised 
continuously throughout my research process. After preliminary research, I concluded 
that Turkey's efforts in Somalia were overall a good example of Turkey's use of soft 
power in a conflict environment. Despite further and more in-depth research, this 
conclusion has remained virtually intact. Of course, I discovered areas in which Turkey 
could improve its assistance to Somalia as described in that chapter; for example, 
coordinating cash aid more effectively through the proper government agencies instead 
of channeling the bulk of it through the President's office, or more openly 
acknowledging that the aid Turkey provides does influence the conflict by bolstering 
the Somali Federal Government and thus, taking steps to ensure that certain 
accountability and transparency measures are taken as a condition of receipt. However, 
my research indicates that overall, Turkey's efforts in Somalia are producing positive 
results for Somali stakeholders, the international community, and Turkey itself; and that 
Turkey is continually striving to improve its service delivery by, for example, 
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expanding the scope of its aid to areas outside of Mogadishu. The positive relationship 
Turkey has cultivated led to Turkey mediating between Somalia and Somaliland. 
Though the mediation has thus far not produced tangible results, both parties have 
acknowledged Turkey's unique qualification to act as mediator and have expressed 
satisfaction with Turkey's role.  
 On the other hand, my initial conclusions regarding Turkey's role in the Syrian 
conflict have been revised more extensively than those regarding Somalia, and have 
gained further nuance with more in-depth research. I initially determined that Turkey's 
efforts in Syria had produced unintended consequences which make it less of a 'success 
story' than Somalia, but that those consequences were not so much a result of Turkish 
actions but of the unpredictable and chaotic conflict context. At the time of my 
preliminary research, for example, I thought that Turkey's switch from attempting to 
influence the Assad regime's response to supporting the opposition was a logical, if 
hasty, response to the conflict dynamics. Later, after discussing the move with Dr. Aras 
and comparing Turkey's actions with some of Ahmet Davutoğlu's statements and 
writings on Turkey's vision of mediation, I began to revise my initial conclusion. 
Turkey's abrupt divorce with Assad was not in line with any of Turkey's stated ideals 
regarding mediation as a means of conflict resolution, and seemed to be more of an 
emotional response to Assad's uncooperative nature rather than a means of moving 
toward a settlement of the conflict. Turkey's lack of a relationship with Assad might 
have prevented it from playing a more constructive role as a mediator in the conflict. 
For example, Turkey could have played a larger role in the Geneva I and II meetings 
between the Syrian regime, opposition, and international parties; helping to facilitate 
dialogue or mediate between the parties.  
 Another way that my conclusions regarding Turkey's role in the Syrian conflict 
gained more nuance is that I discovered through a second round of research that Turkey 
is playing a very significant and beneficial role as a provider of humanitarian aid. Just 
as Turkey mobilized civil society, NGOs, and government ministries to aid Somalia, 
many of the same organizations are involved in providing aid to Syrian refugees in 
Turkey and even Internally Displaced Persons within Syria. In other words, Turkey may 
have failed to mobilize international support for humanitarian intervention, and may not 
have been able to support the Syrian opposition enough to enable them to topple the 
Assad regime, but they are still playing a constructive role in the conflict through 
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humanitarian endeavors. Perhaps if Turkey had confined its involvement to 
humanitarian efforts, similar to its involvement in the Somalia conflict, it would have 
been able to play a more constructive role as a mediator in the Syrian conflict.  
 
 
6.2 Turkey's capacity for conflict intervention 
 
 
At first glance, the comparison between Turkish involvement in Syria and 
Somalia seems counterintuitive. There are more differences than similarities; prior to 
the civil war, Syria was a stable country with a legitimate government, ties to the 
international community, and a growing economy that did not rely on foreign aid. 
Somalia was a failed state with only a transitional government and no ties to the 
international community, with NGOs and governments operating their offices from 
neighboring Nairobi. Now, Syria is in the midst of a violent civil war with over a 
million refugees spilling into neighboring countries, Turkey most especially, while 
Somalia has transitioned to a 'fragile state' rather than a 'failed' one with an elected 
government. However, the differences enable observers to draw important conclusions 
about Turkish foreign policy, and the similarities are stronger than they initially appear. 
Considering that "former U.N. envoy for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi has warned that the 
war-torn country [Syria] was heading toward becoming “another Somalia” ruled by 
warlords," these two cases could prove ideal in understanding when Turkish soft power, 
and specifically mediation capacity, is at its best and worst.
295
  
 When Turkey first began to deepen its relationship with Syria around 2009, 
conditions were at their prime. The Syrian government was open to becoming a more 
active member of the international community, it had seemed to weather the Arab 
Spring without significant unrest, and welcomed its increasing ties to Turkey. These 
conditions seem to be the ideal ones for Turkish involvement. Similar to Somalia, there 
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was a governing entity capable of inviting Turkey to become more involved; a lack of 
international attention but not outright hostility; and room for rapid economic, 
humanitarian, and educational development. A comparison of the two cases shows that 
Turkey may be ready to take the lead on mediation, peacebuilding, and humanitarian 
efforts in cases like Somalia, and Syria prior to the civil war. However, Turkey has not 
reached the point where it can expect to play a positive role in violent conflicts that are 
at their peak, as is the current Syrian civil war. When the level of violence makes it 
impossible for Turkey to do what it does best - infrastructure development, educational 
exchanges, security force training, etc. - its power to mediate and play a constructive 
role in the conflict is greatly reduced.  
 However, Turkey can still play a constructive role in a violent conflict like Syria 
and set itself up for greater involvement after the peak of violence. Turkey does this 
through support for refugees and involvement of its humanitarian workers to the extent 
possible. In fact, many of the same organizations that support the rebuilding of Somalia 
also support Syrian refugees in Turkey.  If Turkey had managed to support refugees 
while maintaining some distance from both the Assad regime and opposition, it might 
be in a better position today to mediate in the conflict.  
 
 
6.3 Turkey's philosophy of conflict intervention 
 
 
As described in the Syria chapter, Turkey has worked hard in the past few years 
to develop a close relationship with Assad's Syria. Turkey did not just rush to intervene 
once the protests and later, violence, began; Turkey has been carefully cultivating a 
relationship upon which the Foreign Ministry believed they could rely when it came 
time to deal with these tough issues along with the Assad regime. For example, Turkey 
intervened with Syria in the August 2006 Lebanon Crisis when its relationship with 
Israel was becoming increasingly strained. Aras and Gorener's statements regarding 
Turkish intervention in the Crisis echo what Aras later told me regarding Turkey's 
attitude at the beginning of the Syrian protest; that Assad would listen to logic:  
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Turkey’s involvement in this crisis stood in stark contrast to its former stance of 
deliberate non-involvement in Syria’s regional affairs and Middle Eastern 
conflicts in general, which again demonstrates the confidence of Turkish policy-
makers that Turkish–Syrian relations were in such good standing that Syria 
would respond positively to Turkish demands in regional matters. 
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In contrast to 2006 however, Assad did not listen to Turkey and instead insulted the 
Foreign Ministry's years of relationship building by failing to heed its suggestions and 
eventually, demands.  
Bülent Aras explained the Turkish government's and specifically Prime 
Minister's reasoning behind intervention in Syria. He began by saying that "geography 
has bitter historical memories."
297
 People need to understand the history and historical 
traumas before they can understand how governments in the region can make such 
drastic decisions. He described how the Prime Minister considered the Halepci 
massacre in Iraq in 1988, when Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against the 
Kurds. Then he considered the Hama massacre in Syria in 1982, when the Hafiz Assad 
regime decimated the village in order to wipe out the Muslim Brotherhood, killing up to 
30,000 Syrians in the process. Dr. Aras described how the Prime Minister made an 
interesting statement when Assad began attacking the protesters; he said, "I will not let 
another Halepci and Hama happen in this geography." Dr. Aras went on, "Of course it's 
a very wise statement if you say I will not let another Hama or Halepci happen in this 
geography that makes you a regional leader, but later on you need to fulfill this promise. 
This high rhetoric sometimes puts the Foreign Ministry people into real trouble to fulfill 
it."
298
 This is a blunt reminder that though the Turkish government's grand humanitarian 
ambitions may be heartfelt and sincere, it is still easier said than done.  
Though pledging to prevent massacres sounds like the "morally correct" 
position, the practical steps that must be taken in order to do so are not clear-cut. The 
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difference between refusing to support Assad due to his violence against the Syrian 
people versus actively working toward his overthrow causes Turkey to move from the 
realm of activist foreign policy to something more akin to nation building, or at the very 
least, the threat of military intervention. Once these promises are made public, the 
Turkish government must either take the necessary steps to fulfill them, or risk losing 
face not only in front of the international community, but the hundreds of thousands of 
Syrian refugees currently living in Turkey, along with the Turkish citizens who vote 
them into power. The tension between fulfilling their promises and balancing strategic 
considerations of their own power and limited military strength has caused the AKP 
government to entrench themselves ever deeper in the Syrian conflict without leaving 
themselves with a safe exit strategy. Therefore, Turkey will continue to shelter refugees, 
support the opposition, and to some extent, mediate among the various parties to the 
conflict in order to fulfill their promises to the Syrian people, but not at the level 
necessary to actually resolve the conflict. The amount of force necessary to allow the 
opposition to triumph over Assad is more than the Turkish government and military can 
muster alone. Not only is the strategy reactionary, but it illustrates the sharp divide 
between the AKP and previous administrations:   
This is where the AKP’s perspective on regional matters is distinct from Ozal’s 
regional activism, which was primarily driven by a powerful economic initiative. 
AKP’s regional initiatives are often motivated by a normative moral framework. 
That is, Turkey is developing a strongly pronounced sense of responsibility to 
provide stability for the people and countries of the region with which it shares a 
common historical heritage.
299
 
When the sense of responsibility is not matched by capability or international will, 
Turkey's involvement in an ongoing violent conflict becomes precarious.  
 In relation to international will, there seems to be differing views regarding 
Turkey's reliance on the United States. Due to Turkey's experience dealing with the 
United States when it attempted to mediate with Iran and the international community, 
Turkey has learned that "mediation is good when you do not put all your eggs into one 
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basket."
300
 During the Iranian mediation attempt, Turkey and Brazil convinced Iran to 
meet the United States' conditions but in the end, the U.S. rejected the deal anyway. 
Perhaps the United States never expected Turkey to succeed in convincing Iran to 
accept the conditions. This experience taught Turkey not to rely on U.S. assistance in 
future intervention attempts. Dr. Aras assured me that Turkey's calculations in Syria are 
made without consideration of significant amounts of U.S. aid. However, Erdoğan's 
statements advocating humanitarian intervention make it clear that Turkey strongly 
desired to intervene in Syria, and the Turkish government worked hard to generate 
international support for such intervention. Since Turkey could not generate support for 
intervention, it's efforts to support the Syrian opposition were not enough to end the 
conflict decisively. We can only speculate how Turkey would have acted, and how 
much support it would have given the opposition, if it knew that international 
intervention would not be forthcoming.  
 
 
6.4 Turkey's humanitarian success 
 
 
 In contrast to the situation with Syria, Turkey has so far managed to stay on the 
course it originally envisioned when it began its involvement with Somalia. All of my 
Turkish government-affiliated interviewees, Ufuk Gezer, Bülent Aras, and Ertuğral 
Apakan, took pains to emphasize that Turkey's involvement in Somalia is purely out of 
moral necessity. As already described, the Somali people, ranging from ordinary 
citizens to academics to government officials, largely perceive Turkey to be an 
impartial, effective, friend of Somalia, just as Turkey perceives itself. In fact, Turkey 
can even use its efforts in Somalia as prime examples of its increasing soft power and 
influence in the region. After establishing an embassy and operating regular Turkish 
Airlines flights in Mogadishu; creating educational exchanges for Somali students to 
study in Turkey; building Mogadishu's finest hospital; giving direct aid to the 
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Transitional Federal Government for use in such efforts as strengthening the security 
forces; and assisting NGOs, religious charities, and Turkish businesses through TIKA to 
invest in and support Somalia, Turkey is able to act as a mediator between Somalia and 
Somaliland and take one of the main roles in the international community in support of 
the country.     
 Yet, even with Somalia there is a slight difference between Turkey's rhetoric and 
action. Ufuk Gezer stated that "You can strengthen the hand of the central government 
which will in turn increase the confidence of the people in their central government, 
which might weaken the clout of the insurgents" in reference to the idea of giving direct 
monetary aide to the Somali government to be used in reforming the security 
services.
301
 Of course, Turkey must work through the central government as the only 
legitimate governing entity capable of representing Somalia, but it should also be more 
conscious of the repercussions of its relationship with the Somali government. As 
International Crisis Group points out, giving cash aide directly to the Somali 
government without also expecting controls and accountability for its use may 
perpetuate the government's lack of accountability to its citizens and increase 
corruption. Even within the Somali government, aid may be given to some ministries or 
officials and not others, further undermining governance.
302
 The Turkish government 
must carefully balance its stated goals of efficiency, autonomy, and self-government for 
Somalia with the need to ensure that its aid does not directly or indirectly support 
corruption or be used to prop up an unaccountable government.    
 Turkey's work with Syrian refugees also constitutes a humanitarian success. As 
discussed in the Syria chapter, Turkey has mobilized a huge support network of 
government ministries, civil society organizations, and NGOs to assist the Syrian 
refugees in Turkey, and eventually allowed international NGOs to operate in Turkey 
and assist the refugees. It is clear from the research so far that Turkey has good 
intentions. Certainly, Turkey's involvement in Somalia is primarily motivated by 
humanitarian goals, and is perceived that way by Somalis themselves, the most 
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important constituents. Turkey's involvement in Syria is in large part due to necessity, 
but still it is clear that the Foreign Ministry is concerned by Syrians' suffering and has 
taken many steps to ease it, most notably through well-supplied refugee camps. As 
Davutoğlu explained, the two cases are closely tied in Turks' minds as humanitarian 
causes: 
 This is a test, an ethical test for all of us. If one day we will be living with Syrian 
brothers and sisters next to each other, it is right today to help them, to share our 
wealth, to share our destiny. Many people questioned, again, why Turkey spent 
300 million dollars to Somalia. We don’t have any national interest. Yes, but we 
have a huge ethical ideal to help them.
303
 
Therefore, we see that in Turkey's efforts to help Somalia and in its humanitarian aid to 
Syrian refugees, rhetoric, action, and perception converge; Turkey conceptualizes it as 
an altruistically-motivated action, and stakeholders agree with this conception.  
 
 
6.5 Turkey's effective use of soft power to intervene in conflicts 
 
 
 Despite Turkey's humanitarian success, the question still remains; is Turkey able 
to fulfill its ideals on the ground? As the director of the International Crisis Group in 
Turkey, Hugh Pope, pointed out, "It would be very nice if there was an example where 
Turkey had solved its own conflict. It would give a lot more legitimacy and credibility 
to Turkey's wish to be a constructive player" in the mediation of other regional 
conflicts.
304
 Turkey currently has strained relations with Israel and Armenia, has failed 
to end the stalemate in the Northern Cyprus conflict, and has still not satisfactorily 
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resolved the Kurdish conflict. Then, Turkey was given the opportunity to truly lead by 
example when faced with the Gezi protests starting in May 2013. After Turkey had 
encouraged the Assad administration to listen to the protesters in Syria, few could have 
imagined the violence with which Turkish protesters would be met. Amnesty 
International's report on the protests and Turkish response is subtitled "Brutal denial of 
the right to peaceful assembly in Turkey" and describes the abuse not only of protesters, 
but of "journalists reporting from the protests, doctors treating the injured and lawyers 
defending their rights."
305
 By July 10th there were 8,000 injuries, and five deaths by 
August. Even the Turkish government rhetoric about the protests sounded eerily similar 
to the Assad regime's, as Amnesty International points out, "the government has 
repeatedly sought to discredit the protestors’ motives, integrity and behavior. Public 
officials have variously referred to the protestors as hooligans and claimed that marginal 
or even terrorist groups were behind the protests."
306
 Though the protests eventually 
ended in August 2013, the police involved in serious abuse and rights violations have 
largely gone unprosecuted, and the protesters' concerns regarding the use of public 
space have been unheeded. Turkey's relationship to the Assad regime becomes more 
complex when seen in light of the response to its own internal conflict.  
Another issue that arises when comparing Turkish rhetoric to reality is the 
emotional nature of its reactions. As discussed in the Somalia chapter, Turkey's 
intervention was clearly motivated in part by concern for fellow Muslim brothers who 
were suffering. There were other important considerations too, such as the desire to 
make an inroad in Africa for Turkish businesses and demonstrate Turkey's soft power. 
When dealing with the Syrian conflict, Turkish government officials had what could 
arguably be called an emotional response to the Assad government once it became clear 
that Assad would not listen to Turkish advice when dealing with the protesters. Hugh 
Pope states that "the diplomats were angry and not just Erdoğan…after the Syrians 
promised change the Turkish side announced it as a kind of victory."
307
 Then, the Assad 
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regime backed out of its stated compromises and increasingly used violence to oppress 
the protesters. Turkey rather quickly switched sides and began supporting the 
opposition, never looking back to continue the dialogue with Assad. On the other hand, 
Pope also points out the real humanitarian crisis that was evidently looming in Syria. As 
mentioned above, Bülent Aras also stated that Turkish government officials would not 
allow another massacre to occur in their region. Perhaps Turkish officials believed that 
if they continued to talk to Assad while he procrastinated implementing their 
suggestions and instead used violence against the protesters, they would be seen as 
complicit in the crime, so they took the drastic step of completely cutting off 
communication with Assad and switching to talks with the opposition. This is just 
speculation regarding their motivations; the only thing we can understand with more 
certainty is the results. Rather than preventing another massacre, the Syrian conflict has 
spiraled out of control into a civil war. Turkey's (and the international community's) 
support has not proven enough to give the opposition the upper hand, nor too little to 
cause the opposition's downfall. Instead, the conflict has reached a stalemate which only 
seems possible to solve with either a surge of support for one side or the other, or 
mediated talks. Since Turkey has completely alienated the Assad regime, it no longer 
seems possible for Turkey to play a mediating role in the conflict, if mediation is even 
possible at this point.  
Ahmet Davutoğlu’s statement in his speech to the London School of Economics 
and Political Science neatly summarized Turkey's foreign policy philosophy: 
As Turkey - I said in one of our latest ambassador’s conferences to our 
ambassadors - you will not run after history. You will run in the history and you 
will lead in front of the history. You may do wrong. We are not perfect. We may 
sometimes do mistakes. But even doing a mistake could be corrected. But if you 
don’t have any position, there is even nothing to be corrected. 308 
Davutoğlu’s assertion that it is better to do something and fix it later than to be 
paralyzed by inaction and do nothing is certainly an apt description of Turkey's dramatic 
choices in the Syrian and Somalian cases. Turkey's rapid entry into Somalia started off 
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positively and gave Turkey the chance to correct, or perhaps more accurately, 
reposition, its actions in the country. For example, Turkey can now consider expanding 
its offices and projects beyond Mogadishu in order to provide the rest of the country 
with similar support and avoid exacerbating inequalities. On the other hand, Turkey's 
initial involvement with Syria was not an impulsive choice, but some of the choices 
made as the conflict intensified seemed to be. What distinguishes Turkey's involvement 
in the two cases is the stage of the conflict. In Somalia, Turkey had the opportunity to 
use soft power after the conflict had already reached its peak; the pressing issue was 
feeding starving Somalis during the famine. Though there is certainly still violence in 
Somalia, Mogadishu is no longer a war zone; there was a Transitional Federal 
Government at the time of Turkey's initial involvement in Somalia and there is now a 
government recognized by the international community and a majority of Somalis. Most 
importantly, the government requested Turkey's help and is happy to work with Turkey 
in order to benefit the country. In contrast, Turkey began engaging with Syria before the 
conflict started, but found itself beyond the limits of soft power once civil war broke 
out. After civil war began in Syria, Turkey was no longer involved at the request of the 
Syrian government; there was no internationally-recognized, legitimate governing entity 
with which Turkey could coordinate aid; there was no opportunity for soft power 
techniques such as education exchanges, joint military exercises, healthcare assistance, 
infrastructure development, or economic ties that are staples of Turkish foreign policy. 
Syria demonstrates the reality that when Turkey's soft power does not achieve the 
desired outcome, its rhetoric starts to exceed its capabilities. A comparison of the two 
cases shows that Turkey's soft power is beneficial post-conflict, to a limited extent pre-
conflict, but not during actual violent conflict.  
 
 
6.6 Application to other small states 
 
 
 The lessons learned from Turkey's attempts to use its soft power and mediation 
capacity in Syria and Somalia can find broader applicability by discussing how other 
113 
 
small states can benefit from it. As mentioned in the literature review, Randa Slim 
(1992) writes that despite the superpowers' historic dominance of mediation activities, 
small states have also played important roles as mediators. Small states use persuasion 
to mediate conflicts, whereas superpowers use power and coercion. Since small states 
usually do not possess the economic or military resources to influence a conflict through 
coercion, they must rely on other resources. Slim writes that "the power of a small state 
as a mediator usually resides in its neutrality, and its fair treatment of all parties' basic 
interests and concerns."
309
 As discussed above, Turkey was unable to maintain 
neutrality in the Syrian conflict, with the conflict actually becoming akin to a domestic 
one rather than foreign for the Turkish government. On the other hand, the Somali 
Federal Government and academics emphasize Turkey's perceived lack of interest or 
historical antagonism in the Somali conflict, giving Turkey added legitimacy as a 
mediator between Somalia and Somaliland.  
 Some small states are already practicing a form of mediation similar to Turkey's. 
For example, Norway works closely with Turkey on developing the Friends of 
Mediation initiative and is also a well-known small state mediator. In fact, it might be 
appropriate to say that Turkey is learning from Norway, as Norway has a long history of 
mediating in conflicts such as Israel-Palestine, Guatemala, Sri Lanka and Sudan.
310
 
Foster (2010) uses the example of Norway's mediation with Sudan to describe its 
creation of "a new model of conflict resolution which emphasizes personal trust, long 
term commitment, and neutrality."
311
 Two of the three most important elements of the 
"Norwegian model" of conflict resolution are similar to Turkey's method; creating 
personal trust and making a long term commitment to play an active role in resolving 
the conflict. Mason and Sguaitamatti (2011) deem Turkey along with Brazil, Qatar, and 
Malaysia to be part of a group of "emerging mediators" which use mediation to increase 
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their soft power within a specific group of states.
312
 This discussion is situated in the 
context of how Switzerland can become involved in international mediation, where 
Switzerland's characteristic as a small state is emphasized as being beneficial to its 
mediation capabilities.   
 
 
6.7 Suggestions for future research 
 
 
Since the Syrian conflict is ongoing, there will of course be multitudes of future 
research regarding not only Turkey's role in it, but also its impact on Turkey. Focusing 
on Turkey's involvement in the Syrian and Somalian cases, there is an important area 
for future research that is not immediately obvious. First, it is necessary for Turkey to 
carefully study and document the various interventions it undertakes and, to the extent 
possible, the effect each intervention has on the conflict into which Turkey is 
intervening. As anyone involved in mediation efforts can attest, it's sometimes difficult 
to quantify "success" and "failure." A successful mediation may prevent a conflict 
before most people become aware of it, while a failed mediation is more obvious. 
Certainly, "failed" mediations do not always reflect a failure on the part of the mediator, 
but are often indicative of intractable conflicts to which peaceful solutions are not viable 
for one or both of the parties involved. I was reminded about these ideas regarding 
failure and success often during my interviews with Turkish government advisors, and 
sometimes it seemed that the ambiguity surrounding success and failure was used as a 
justification for why the Turkish government does not appear to be collecting data 
regarding tactics used in the various conflict zones in which Turkey is involved. For 
example, Ufuk Gezer, the Directorate General for Policy Planning in the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is responsible for dealing with mediation as a theme and 
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driving it to a more prominent place in the international agenda with organizations such 
as the United Nations. Yet, he is not aware of specific mediation strategies being used in 
current conflicts, such as Syria. Similarly, the "desks" in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
are staffed with regional experts who are not necessarily trained in classical mediation 
techniques, and who are not intimately familiar with what goes on at other desks. I am 
not sure how much dialogue occurs between members of the Syria and Somalia desks, 
for example, but a good avenue for future research would be to gauge the extent of 
dialogue and how it can be improved to gain a better understanding of Turkey's 
involvement in various conflicts and the effect it has on the conflict dynamics. Then, the 
lessons learned can be applied to Turkey's larger mediation strategy. When asked the 
question, "How do you take the lessons learned from mediation efforts in those specific 
conflicts and apply them to Turkey's larger mediation strategy?” Gezer was unable to 
explain how the Foreign Ministry actually does it. His answer, even after repeated 
clarification, that "the lessons that we get is that we live in an extremely complicated 
world, it's not really easy to see…for planners and strategists like us, life is really tough 
because it's not really easy to see ahead," shows an unwillingness to acknowledge that 
more careful study is needed.
313
 Future research should also examine whether there is a 
need for closer coordination among the various Foreign Ministry desks assigned to deal 
with regional conflicts and the civil society organizations that implement soft power 
tactics on the ground, such as TIKA, the Turkish Red Crescent, and even the Religious 
Affairs Directorate.  
Finally, future research could focus on the role of small states in mediating 
international conflicts, and on how small states can learn from one another's mediation 
attempts. For example, a case study comparing various small state mediation attempts to 
understand the most commonly used techniques and their repercussions could be 
attempted; perhaps using Turkey, Norway, and Brazil as cases, to name a few. More 
research is necessary to understand how small states may use their soft power 
effectively in mediating international conflicts, since the age of superpower dominance 
is waning and today's intractable social conflicts call for more nuanced approaches. 
Small states such as Turkey will play a huge role in providing humanitarian assistance, 
peacebuilding activities, and mediation in the future.  
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